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This paper investigates the e¤ects of stock exchange consolidation on foreign portfolio hold-
ings. Sharing a common stock exchange platform enhances cross-border investments, and the
consolidation e¤ect is particularly pronounced among member countries that are smaller in
size and closer in geographical, cultural and economic terms. These ndings survive di¤erent
econometric specications and outlier treatments. After accounting for endogeneity of the con-
solidation process, the e¤ect of exchange consolidation on cross-border investment is conrmed.
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1 Motivation and relevance
Since the beginning of the century, increased competition between stock exchanges triggered im-
portant structural changes in the securities market industry that underwent a process of gradual
consolidation. Increased cross-border capital ows, on the one hand, and the evolution of infor-
mation and communication technology, on the other hand, have brought to the transformation of
trading systems. This process gradually led to more harmonized listing and corporate governance
standards, to more intense cross-listing activity, and, nally, to the consolidation of trading systems
and exchanges. This transformation drove the integration of stock exchanges, rst, within countries,
and, then, across countries and continents.
This paper focuses on the e¤ect of stock exchange mergers on international portfolio allocation
of intermediaries and retail investors, and ts within the literature on the transaction cost-based
explanations of cross-border investments. More specically, our analysis aims at empirically assessing
if stock exchange consolidation can represent a cost-e¤ective incentive to foreign investments.
The seminal contributions by Black (1974) and Stulz (1981a) develop equilibrium models of in-
ternational asset pricing that explain home bias that is the disproportionate investment in domestic
assetsrelying on transaction cost frictions to international capital ows. Tesar and Werner (1995)
suggest that transaction costs are unlikely to be an explanation for home bias, as the portfolio
turnover rates are much higher for foreign than for domestic assets. Their nding is inuential but
controversial. Warnock (2002) suggests that this under-weighted but overtraded puzzle in foreign eq-
uities could be due to the intrinsic problems in estimating the cross-border holdings (a stock measure)
based on the capital ow data (a ow measure). Moreover, Faruqee et al. (2004) show that trans-
action costs related variables, such as bilateral distance, bilateral phone costs, and communication
infrastructure are signicant factors that a¤ect international investment.
In the barrier model, transaction costs, as well as taxes on the rate of return to foreign investment,
are treated as barriers. By lowering these barriers, the level of expected rate of returns for investors
raises, since the cost associated with holding foreign investments declines. Black (1974) and Stulz
(1981b) focus on taxes as barriers to international investments. Huizinga (1991) explicitly underlines
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that yield di¤erentials between domestic and foreign stocks for foreign investors are signicant as a
consequence of these barriers, and speculates on the various forms that foreign investment incentives
can take. For foreign investment incentives to be cost e¤ective, ideally they should apply only, or at
least more strongly, to foreign investors than to domestic investors.
Our analysis builds on this strand of literature and aims at empirically assessing if stock exchange
consolidation represents a cost-e¤ective incentive to cross-border investments.
The existing literature has investigated the impact of cross-listing, foreign listing, and stock
exchange consolidation from the perspective of rms or exchange shareholders.
Schmiedel and Schönenberger (2006) describe the consolidation process in the securities exchange
industry of the Euro area. First, they observe the integration at the national level, and between
cash and derivative markets, and then the consolidation process, with the creation of the rst pan-
European exchange, that is, Euronext.
Nielsson (2009) empirically investigates the e¤ect of the Euronext stock exchange merger on listed
rms. The results show that gains from the stock exchange merger are concentrated among big and
foreign-oriented rms.
Hasan and Schmiedel (2004) investigate whether the adoption of network strategies by European
stock exchanges over the period 1996-2000 created additional value in the provision of trading ser-
vices. They nd that a network strategy is associated with higher market capitalization and lower
transaction costs.
More recently, Hasan et al. (2012) investigate the e¤ect of di¤erent degrees of stock exchange inte-
gration on exchange shareholdersvalue creation over the period 2000-2008. Their ndings emphasize
that mergers and acquisitions create more value than alliances and, among alliances, joint ventures
generate more value than nonequity alliances. They nd that cross-border integration creates more
value than domestic, and that horizontal integration creates more value than vertical integration.
More value accruing to exchange shareholders is also associated with better shareholder protection,
accounting standards, and capital market development of the partner exchanges.
Dorodnykh (2014) systematically analyzes the process of stock exchange integration over the pe-
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riod 1995-2010, and investigates the determinants of stock exchange integration. She highlights that
nancial regulation, cross-membership agreements, and openness are important drivers of mergers
and acquisitions in the stock exchange industry, whilst the size of the stock exchanges negatively
a¤ects the likelihood of successful mergers.
The above cited literature generally converges on the benets of stock exchange consolidation
accruing to exchange shareholders and listing rms: mergers are the natural response to tough
competition, and permit to substantially reduce the costs of trading, to increase liquidity, and then
to compete on a world scale. However, regulation market authorities are also concerned that the
consolidation process, by reducing the competition among stock exchanges, does not result in abuse
of exchange market power, to ensure that also investors benet from a reduction in transaction costs.
This is the rst paper, to the best of our knowledge, which focuses on the e¤ect of stock exchange
mergers on international portfolio allocation of intermediaries and retail investors, and analyzes the
impact of cross-country stock exchange consolidation on international stock holdings. Giofré (2013a)
makes a rst attempt to estimate the role of the Euronext creation on the international portfolio
holdings of four European investing countries (Italy, France, Spain, Sweden), in the period 2001-2004.
She nds a signicant role of Euronext only for individual investors, while institutional investors and
the aggregate economy appear to be non sensitive to the stock exchange consolidation process.
Pownall et al. (2014) compare changes in foreign and domestic ownership of Euronext-traded rms
with concurrent changes in foreign and domestic ownership of other EU companies, and nd that
the integration of the Euronext market is associated with a reduction in home bias for rms listed
on the named segments of the Euronext exchange. They interpret this evidence as consistent with
the information costs hypothesis: the decrease in information costs, due to the pre-commitments to
enhanced transparency, made the segment rms more attractive to all categories of foreign investors.
The exclusive focus on the Euronext consolidation event and on a narrow time span does not
permit, however, a rigorous and systematic investigation of the stock exchange consolidation phe-
nomenon.
Over the time span covered by our analysis (2001-2015), several stock exchange consolidations
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occurred, involving di¤erent countries. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the exchange
consolidation history.
The rst case of stock exchange fusion is the creation of the Euronext stock exchange, in Septem-
ber 2000, from the merger of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris stock exchange. In September 2002,
the Euronext platform further enlarged to include the Lisbon exchange, which in November 2003
successfully migrated to the common trading and clearing systems. In 2003 Euronext also acquired
the London-based derivatives market LIFFE. In April 2007, the New York Stock Exchange and
Euronext merged to create a new transatlantic project, the NYSE Euronext group. In November
2013 Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), completed the acquisition of NYSE Euronext. In June 2014
Euronext completed an initial public o¤ering making it a standalone company again, separated from
the NYSE exchange.
In 2004, the OMX joint company was created, from the merger of the OM Group, controlling the
OM Stockholm Stock Exchange, the Helsinki exchange and the Tallin exchange. In January 2005
the Copenhagen stock exchange joined the group, and in October 2006 the company also took a 10
per cent stake in Oslo Holding ASA, the owner of Oslo Stock Exchange. In March 2008, the Nasdaq
acquisition of OMX gave birth to the NASDAQ OMX Group.
In March 2007, after a bid of the London Stock Exchange to the shareholders of the Italian Stock
Exchange, the fusion between British and Italian stock markets occurred (LSE-BI).
In September 2009 the Central and Eastern Europe Stock Exchange Group (CEESEG) was
established, comprising the Budapest, Ljubljana, Prague, and Vienna stock exchanges.
In December 2009, Peru, Colombia and Chile stock exchanges agreed to create the single trading
platform Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano (MILA), which started o¢ cially its operations in May
2011. The Mexican Stock Exchange joined in December 2014, thus making MILA the largest Latin
American market in terms of listed companies, and the second biggest stock market in terms of
capitalization, after the Brazilian stock exchange.
The establishment of these mergers can potentially lead to important benets for the stability of
nancial markets: the standardization of trading platforms could, on average, reduce the likelihood
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of stock price jumps (Yuna (2016)), have a positive e¤ect on stock market information e¢ ciency and
turnover (Hellström et al. (2018)), and reduce the costs of cross-border trading through an increase
in market liquidity and a reduction in market fragmentation (McAndrews and Stefanadis (2002)).
Our ndings contribute to the understanding of the impact of exchange consolidation, not only on
listing rms and exchange shareholders, but on investors, in particular the foreign ones, more heavily
a¤ected by investment barriers, and then potentially more sensitive to an institutional change that
could alleviate them. This paper emphasizes how the creation of a common exchange platform
enhances foreign investment among member countries, after accounting for the endogeneity of the
consolidation process. A crucial role is played by stock market information: it drives the consolidation
process, and then further fosters reciprocal cross-border investments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the estimable
equation. In Section 3, we describe the data, and provide the descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we
report the results of the empirical analysis, with its robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. In
Section 5, we extensively deal with the endogeneity issues, provide instrumental variable estimates,
and discuss the implications for cross-border investment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Estimable equation
This paper aims to assess the role of stock exchange consolidation on foreign equity portfolios.1
Following the literature on investment barriers, the theoretical framework rests on the return-
reducing approach of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Chan et al. (2005): in equilibrium, investors
are supposed to face di¤erent costs when investing in various nancial markets, and what matters is
the investment barrier relative to the average.
Absent any investor-specic factor, the "unbiased" portfolio holding of an asset depends, as in
standard portfolio choice theory, on asset characteristics (risk and return). When considering equi-
librium asset holdings without investment barriers, all investors ought to hold the same portfolio,
1Domestic positions and home bias are therefore not investigated, but domestic shares indirectly impact our analysis,
since the weight of each foreign stock index in the overall portfolio also depends on the domestic share.
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i.e., the value-weighted portfolio, in which each asset is weighted according to its share in world stock
market capitalization. The same portfolio is still universally optimal in equilibrium even in the pres-
ence of investment barriers, provided that these barriers identically a¤ect all investors. Conversely,
heterogeneity in bilateral-specic investment barriers generates a wedge between the investor-specic
optimal portfolio and the value-weighted portfolio. This wedge depends, in particular, on the dis-
tance between the investment barrier of country l investing in country j; and the average barrier
calculated over all countries investing in asset j.
The actual portfolio weight in asset j by country l is wlj, while MSj is the market share of asset
j in the world market capitalization.
We label the ratio wlj
MSj
as "scaled foreign portfolio weight", or "foreign bias" in asset j of a
representative investor in country l. A portfolio share wlj larger than js market share signals that
asset j is over-weighted in country ls portfolio, while a ratio lower than 1 signals that country j is
under-weighted.
To estimate the e¤ect of stock exchange consolidation on foreign portfolio allocation, we run, in














hZhj + "lj (1)
Our regression specication accounts for pair-specic and country-specic factors which poten-
tially capture investment frictions, all expressed in relative terms (except binary variables), scaled
by the world average, as predicted by our theoretical framework..
We include N pair-specic covariates, denoted by Xlj; which are expected to capture bilateral
investment barriers. If we consider, for instance, our main variable of interest, i.e., stock exchange
consolidation (EClj); we conjecture that sharing a common exchange induces higher investment of
country l in country j, and therefore we expect a positive sign for the associated coe¢ cient.
The regression specication also includes K investing-country specic variables Wl, such as,
international capital mobility out of the investing country, number of listed shares in the investing
countrys stock exchange, and H destination country-specic variables Zj, such as, the legal origin
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of the destination country and the degree of liquidity of the destination country stock exchange.
To estimate the above parameters, we adopt, in the baseline specication, a feasible Generalized
Least Squares specication, correcting for both heteroskedasticity and general correlation of obser-
vations across destination countries, with standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at the
investing-country and year levels, as suggested for nance panel data sets (Petersen (2009)). Alter-
native estimation methods, such as Tobit, Negative Binomial and Quantile regression are also run,
to account for censoring, skewness, and high ination of zeros of the response variable. The treat-
ment of outliers is handled through both a winsorization and a truncation of the response variables
distribution. Finally, when dealing with the endogeneity issues, a GMM estimation is implemented.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
We consider equity portfolio investments by 40 investing countries in 41 destination stock markets2,
for the period 20012015. We adopt the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), released
by the IMF, a dataset which has been extensively used in many recent papers (Fidora et al. (2007);
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Sorensen et al. (2007); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré
(2013b)). This survey collects security-level data from the major custodians and large end-investors.
Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument (equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the
latter providing information on the destination of portfolio investments. While the CPIS provides
the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to
a number of important caveats.3 The most important is that the CPIS is unable to address the
issue of third-country holdings and round-tripping, very frequent in the case of nancial o¤shore
centers.4 Moreover, the survey does not report domestic positions, which need to be retrieved from
other sources, as specied in Appendix A.
2See Appendix A, for the full list of investing and destination countries. Note that some countries are included as
investing, but not as destination ones, and vice versa, because of data availability.
3See data.imf.org/cpis, for more details on the survey.
4We will address this specic issue in the Robustness checks of Table 4, column (4).
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Appendix A also reports details on the denition of dependent variable and regressors, and
information on their sources.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables included in our analysis. Panel I reports
the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, that is foreign bias, and of its constituents. The
variable capturing the market share (MSj) measures the size of the destination economys stock
market capitalization relative to the world stock market capitalization. Dahlquist et al. (2003)
estimate the fraction of shares closely held across 51 countries, nding that on average 32 percent of
shares are not available for trading and cannot therefore be held by foreign investors. This induces a
measurement error in the size of domestic and foreign bias that was neglected by previous literature.
Following Dahlquist et al. (2003), we consider the MSCI market share (MS_MSCIj), based on the
free-oat adjusted market capitalization.
The scaled foreign portfolio weight, or foreign bias, is therefore dened as the observed portfolio
weight (wlj) scaled by the oat-adjusted market share (MS_MSCIj). To provide an economic
interpretation of this measure, consider that a scaled foreign share equal to 1 implies that the foreign
asset enters the portfolio with a weight equal to its (oat-adjusted) stock market share. The foreign
bias mean value is 0.4, thus implying that on average the actual portfolio weight is 40 percent of
the oat-adjusted market share. The distribution is very skewed, with a median value equal to 6
percent of the oat-adjusted market share, a maximum value equal to 26.7 and a standard deviation
relatively large, more than three times the sample mean.5 The low median value points out that
foreign assets are generally heavily underweighted, which is the mirror image of the strong home
bias reported in the international nance literature (French and Poterba (1991); Tesar and Werner
(1995); Lewis (1999); Karolyi and Stulz (2003)).
Panel II of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of pair-specic regressors, i.e., variables that
5See Appendix A.1 for details on the exclusion of the outliers from the distribution. Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7
specically deal with the peculiarities of the response variables distribution. The treatment of outliers is also discussed
in Section 5, when dealing with endogeneity issues.
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are specic of the investing-destination lj couple. The rst regressor reported is the main variable of
interest in our analysis, the exchange consolidation variable (EClj), detailed in its sub-components.
Then, the table shows the so-called gravity variables, which capture the geographical (distance,
common border) and cultural distance (common language, colonial linkage) between the investing
and the destination country. The three subsequent regressors are not strictly gravity variables,
but still capture, in institutional terms, the closeness of the countries: the "equal law" dummy
variable, capturing if two countries share the same legal origin (Common Law, French, German,
or Scandinavian), the EMU dummy, which captures the existence of a common currency, and the
GAAP variable, capturing the distance in accounting principles. Also the cross-listing variable seizes
the closeness between investing and destination countries, as it measures the intensity of cross-
listing before the exchange consolidation events. Finally, the trade closeness variable captures the
trade linkages between investing and destination economies, as captured by the average between
the fraction of the investing countrys imports covered by the destination country and the fraction
of the investing countrys exports covered by the destination country. Within the panel of pair-
specic variables, we also report the two instruments proposed to account for the endogeneity of the
consolidation process, and that will be widely discussed in Section 5. The instruments are binary
variables: the rst (J_High_infolj) is equal to 1 if both the investing and the destination country
have a high depth of information in the stock market (0 otherwise); the second (J_Low_sizelj),
is equal to 1 if both the investing and the destination country have a low stock exchange size (0
otherwise).
Panel III of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of country-specic covariates, that is, vari-
ables specic of the investing and/or destination country. The rst regressor reects the international
inward and outward capital mobility, while the second and third regressor refer, respectively, to the
common law versus civil law origin of the destination country,6 and to the antidirector rights legis-
lation, aimed at capturing the degree of protection of minority investorsrights in the destination
6Notice that this variable is di¤erent from the pair-specic variable "equal law" of Panel II, because it is equal to 1
if the destination country has a "common law" legal origin (0 otherwise), regardless of the legal origin of the investing
country.
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country. The fourth regressor is the 1-year lag return of the destination countrys stock index, aimed
at capturing any positive momentum trader or contrarian trader behavior. The subsequent regressors
refer to the size of the stock market (number of listed shares), of the economy (GDP), and to other
characteristics of the stock markets, such as its openness to foreign listing, and its liquidity (turnover
ratio and traded stocks to GDP). The SOX and MiFID regressors refer to the regulatory framework
of the destination countries, while the last two lines report descriptive statistics of country-specic
variables which are related to country level governance, such as regulatory quality and control of
corruption, drawn from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
It is worth stressing that the absolute magnitude of the regressors does not a¤ect per se the size
of the associated coe¢ cient, since all variables, for consistency with the analytical framework, enter
our regression specication in relative terms, that is scaled by their average.7
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Preliminary ndings: size, liquidity and investment
Table 2 reports some preliminary results on the relationship between stock exchange consolidation
(EC), and some basic indicators of stock markets: columns (1) to (5a) report the coe¢ cients from
the regression of the dependent variable at the head of the column on the regressor at the head of
the row, controlling for investing country-xed e¤ects and time-xed e¤ects.
At the head of the rows, three labels for di¤erent specications of the EC indicator are reported.
The rst one ECj refers to the destination country j, and is related to the status of country
j as a member (ECj=1) or not (ECj=0) of a consolidated stock exchange. The second one ECl
refers to the investing country l, and is related to the status of country l as a member or not of
a consolidated stock exchange. The third one EClj is instead the bilateral index of exchange
consolidation, and is equal to 1 if the investing and the destination country share, in a given year,
7With the exception of dummy variables, cross listing measured as fraction of cross-listing in one country relative
to total cross-listing and trade closeness measured as the average between the relative fraction of the bilateral
imports to total imports and of the bilateral exports to total exports.
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the same exchange platform, and 0 otherwise.
Column (1a) of Table 2 reports the regression coe¢ cient of the share of stock market capitalization
of country j (MSj) on ECj: the coe¢ cient is positive, as expected, and statistically signicant
(0.030). In column (1b) of Table 2, we consider an alternative measure of market share,MS_MSCIj,
based on the free-oat adjusted market capitalization (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). The coe¢ cient is still
positive, statistically signicant, and larger in size (0.046). These ndings highlight that countries
joining a consolidated stock exchange platform witness an increase in stock market capitalization by
3-5 percent.
We can rationalize the positive correlation between the market share and the stock market con-
solidation as the result of a higher market liquidity of national stock markets that merged in an
integrated trading platform. In columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 2, we consider as dependent variables
two measures of liquidity of the destination country j, respectively, the relative (to the world average)
ratio of stock trades to GDP and the relative turnover ratio. As expected, both measures, display a
statistically signicant and large correlation (from 0.253 to 0.266) with the ECj index. Stocks traded
in consolidated exchanges display a 25 percent higher liquidity, either measured by the turnover ratio
or by the traded assets to GDP ratio.
On the demand side, we are interested in understanding which investors actually hold the larger
supply of stocks associated with the merging process. In particular, we check if the larger size is
paired with a prevalent increase in the foreign or in the domestic component. In column (3), we
observe the behavior of investors residing in those countries involved in the consolidation process.
We report the correlation between the domestic portfolio share wll and the index of consolidation of
the investing country ECl. Since we include both investing country and time-xed e¤ects, we are
partialling out the e¤ects of a general decrease in home biasover time, or eventual peculiarities of
the investing countries involved in the consolidation processes. Interestingly, those investors residing
in countries whose stock exchanges undergo a consolidation process, show a 11% signicantly lower
domestic portfolio position.
Since countries belonging to a consolidated platform show larger market shares but lower domestic
12
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holdings, then a sharp increase in foreign investment must have occurred.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 2, we investigate the linkage between stock exchange consolidation
and foreign investment. In columns (4), we report the correlation of the foreign share held by country
ls investors in country js stock market (wlj) with the ECj of the destination country, the ECl of the
investing country, and the bilateral specic consolidation index EClj. The correlations are positive
and statistically signicant: the coe¢ cient of ECl is economically negligible, and the coe¢ cient of
EClj is four times larger than the coe¢ cient of the destination-specic index, ECj.
In order to scale the demand side by the supply side e¤ect, we consider in column (5), the foreign
biasmeasure, as dened in Section 2, that is, the ratio of the foreign portfolio share wlj to country
j market share (MS_MSCIj). This normalization allows us to control for the size of the recipient
stock market, which in turn may depend on the consolidation process. The two country-specic
factors ECj and ECl lose statistical signicance, and only the role of the bilateral consolidation
index EClj persists large and signicant (0.788): recalling that a value of the foreign bias equal to
1 points to an actual portfolio weight equal to the market share, and that the sample mean of the
foreign bias is 0.4, we can appreciate the economic relevance of this coe¢ cient.
4.2 Main ndings
The preliminary evidence displayed in Table 2 suggests that belonging to the same trading platform
can help explain the wedge between the actual foreign portfolio share and what is predicted by the
value weighted portfolio. However, this nding might miscapture other bilateral linkages among
the countries under investigation: we need to seize the bilateral exchange consolidation e¤ect, after
partialling out other competing explanatory factors.
In Table 3, we report the results of a multivariate regression which considers the foreign bias as
a dependent variable, and which controls for time-xed e¤ects.
The literature has widely documented that the cultural and geographic proximity of the mar-
kets has an important inuence on investor stock holdings and trading (Brennan and Cao (1997);
Kang and Stulz (1997); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan et al. (2005); Portes and Rey (2005)).
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Column (1) of Table 3 reports the results from a regression including, beyond the exchange consoli-
dation, standard gravity variables such as distance, common border, common language. The variable
distance is measured as the great-circle distance between the capital cities of the destination and
investing countries. The common border (language) dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and
destination country share a common border (language) and 0 otherwise. The rst two variables, dis-
tance and common border, simply capture the physical distance between investing and destination
country, and show, as expected, a signicant negative (-0.105) and positive (0.438) role, respectively.
The role of the common language dummy is intuitively interpretable, since foreign languages make
collecting information more di¢ cult (0.124)
We also include binary variables that capture cultural and institutional linkages. To seize cultural
and historical ties, we control whether countries are tied by colonial heritage. The dummy common
colony variable takes the value 1 if the considered pair of countries shares a similar colonial history,
and 0 otherwise. As expected, the coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant (0.123).
We also include the common currency area (EMU) dummy, taking the value 1 if the investing and
destination countries are EMU members, and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cient is positive and signicant
and its e¤ect is quite large: EMU membership boosts foreign portfolio share by 0.590 compared to
non-member countries. Our ndings are consistent with the evidence reported by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) and Balta and Delgado (2009), who nd, as a result of monetary integration, a notable
increase in foreign investments in the Euro area by EMU countries.
The literature dating back to La Porta et al. (1998), has emphasized that civil law provides in-
ferior protection for minority shareholders. Since portfolio shareholders are by denition minority
shareholders, we expect them to be attracted, ceteris paribus, by destination countries better guar-
anteeing their rights. We include a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the destination countrys
legal system has a "common law" origin, and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cient is, expectedly, positive
and statistically signicant (0.094)
A closely related covariate is the "equal legal origin" binary variable, that is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if source and host countries share the same legal origin (Common Law, French,
14
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German, or Scandinavian), and 0 otherwise. A rationale for a role of the "equal legal origin" on
cross-border investment, regardless of which is the origin, can be drawn from the literature (Lane
(2006); Guiso et al. (2009)). Guiso et al. (2009) nd that commonality in legal origin, among
other determinants, is a source of trust: also building on Cornell and Welch (1996), they argue
that citizens of countries having similar legal systems trust themselves more, because it is easier for
them to obtain legal justice in case of deviation from the legal contract. In line with this literature,
an equal legal origin would capture a basic level of institutional similarity between the source and
destination country: if more similarity implies more attraction, it might directly inuence reciprocal
foreign investments. The coe¢ cient is instead signicant at 5% and negative (-0.019), though this
signicant negative e¤ect disappears or becomes positive in richer specications.
Finally, in line with the gravity approach, we include the size of investing and destination coun-
tries. We cannot rely on the most obvious measure, that is, the stock market capitalization, because
this is already accounted for in the denominator of the foreign bias ratio, the dependent variable. We
therefore adopt two alternative proxies. The rst one, more strictly related to the size of the stock
market, relies on the number of publicly listed companied in a country (listed shares). The second
measure is instead more generally related to the size of the economy, and is the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). To avert endogeneity concerns, we consider the size measures in a time-invariant
fashion, xed at their beginning of period level.8 While the number of listed shares is positively
related with the dependent variable, as expected in a gravity-like specication, the GDP is instead
negatively related with foreign investments. The latter less-obvious nding is consistent with the
more urgent need of relatively smaller countries to diversify their portfolios internationally.
The above described variables play an economically and statistically signicant role in explaining
the dependent variable, but the coe¢ cient of the bilateral consolidation index EClj, after size, gravity
variables, and institutional proximity factors are accounted for, is still statistically signicant and
economically large (0.546).
Institutional barriers to capital mobility can deter investment in foreign countries. In column
8Notice that, to estimate time-invariant country specic factors, such as size, we cannot control for investing and
destination country xed-e¤ects.
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(2) of Table 3, we control for inward and outward capital mobility, proxied by an index measuring
the restrictions imposed by di¤erent countries on capital ows, derived from the Economic Freedom
Network (Chan et al. (2005)). This index ranges from zero to 10, and measures the restrictions
countries impose on capital ows, assigning a lower rating to countries with more restrictions on
foreign capital transactions. We nd that a higher capital mobility in the destination country attracts
more inward investment (0.039), and a higher capital mobility in the investing country pushes foreign
investment (0.124). The coe¢ cient of EClj is only marginally reduced to 0.530.
Among regulatory barriers to information acquisition by foreign investors, Barth et al. (1999)
highlight the importance of the costs faced by foreign investors in understanding other countries
accounting principles. Bae et al. (2008) propose a measure of country-pair di¤erences in 21 accounting
rules based on an international survey of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), in
2001. This measure does not attempt to assess the quality of any given set of accounting rules, but
the extent to which accounting standards di¤er between two countries. Bae et al. (2008) suggest
that analysts tend to avoid following foreign rms adopting accounting rules that are signicantly
di¤erent from the accounting rules used in their home country, because they incur costs to gain
expertise in understanding other countriesGAAP. If this is the case, the "distance" in accounting
standards between two countries could deter bilateral foreign investments. We construct the measure
of bilateral distance in GAAP and test its impact on foreign equity portfolio investment. We show
in column (3) of Table 3 that indeed more distant accounting principles signicantly deter bilateral
investment (-0.046). The coe¢ cient of the EClj index is further reinforced (0.567).
Since the 80s, an increasing number of rms have listed their shares on foreign stock exchanges.
A growing literature has investigated the cross-listing phenomenon, studying the determinants of
the decision to list on foreign stock exchanges, and of the foreign location (Saudagaran (1988);
Saudagaran and Biddle (1995); Pagano et al. (2001)), and evaluating the rmsgains from foreign
listing (Sarkissian and Schill (2009); Sarkissian and Schill (2016)). In column (4) of Table 3, we
include the number of bilateral cross-listing of country j in country l relative to the total cross-listing
in country l, relying on the data reported in Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and relative to bilateral
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cross-listing in December 1998, then prior to the analyzed period. This measure theoretically ranges
from 0 (no bilateral cross-listing between l and j) to 1 (all cross-listing in country l are by country
j0s rms). We nd that, as expected, an increase of the relative cross-listing from 0 to 1 is associated
with a sharp increase in bilateral foreign bias (0.463). The coe¢ cient of the exchange consolidation
coe¢ cient is signicantly reduced (0.330), thus stressing the strong correlation between the two
regressors.9
Table 2 suggests a signicant correlation between liquidity and stock exchange consolidation. In
column (5) of Table 3, we include the stock turnover ratio as a measure of stock market liquidity for
both the investing and the destination economy. To prevent endogeneity concerns, we consider the
turnover ratios xed at their beginning of period level. This covariate displays a positive coe¢ cient
relative to the destination country and a negative coe¢ cient relative to the investing economy:
economies with more liquid stock markets invest less abroad, while more liquid stock markets attract
more inward investments.
Following the literature on the trade-nance nexus (Mundell (1957), Pol and Caballero (2009),
Belke and Domnick (2018)), we also include, in column (6), a variable capturing the trade linkages
among countries. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, trade and nancial ows might behave
either as substitutes (Mundell (1957)), or in more recent models incorporating nancial frictionsas
complements (Pol and Caballero (2009)). This can be an important factor in our analysis, because
an increase in trade integration might either reduce or increase the incentive for capital to ow.
However, it can also introduce a strong source of endogeneity due to reverse causality. We therefore
consider trade ows at their beginning of period levels, and construct a measure of trade closeness
(tradelj) equal to the average of two ratios: the bilateral exports (lj) divided by the total exports of
the investing country l; and the bilateral imports (lj) divided by the total imports of the investing
country l, as drawn from the Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund). This
average theoretically ranges from 0 (no bilateral trade between l and j) to 1 (all foreign trade of
9The inclusion of the cross-listing variable entails a cost in terms reduction in number of observations. Facing the
trade-o¤ between inclusion of a correlated covariate and number of observations, in the light of the strong undercutting
e¤ect of this covariate on our coe¢ cient of interest, we chose to include the cross-listing in the baseline econometric
specication, at the cost of giving up a large number of observations.
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country l occurs with country j). This factor plays a signicant role: an increase of the ratio from 0
to 1 would determine an increase in foreign bias by 0.218, half of its mean value.
Column (6) also includes lagged returns (past 1-year return) as in Chan et al. (2005), to detect any
return-chasing (or "contrarian trader") behavior of investors, that is a tendency to underweight
(or overweight) countries whose stock markets have performed poorly in the past. This covariate is
included as a ratio to the world average past 1-year return and does not appear to signicantly a¤ect
the foreign bias.10
Fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity can
signicantly a¤ect portfolio investment (Gelos and Wei (2005); Leuz et al. (2009)). In column (7),
we include institutional variables generally related to country level governance, such as "political
stability" and "control of corruption", drawn from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World
Bank).11
In column (7), after partialling out the regressors above-described and time-xed e¤ects, we are
left with a coe¢ cient of exchange consolidation still positive, statistically signicant and economically
relevant (0.316).
The interpretation of our main ndings is quite straightforward: investors sharing a common
exchange platform can access foreign assets issued by member countries at a cost closer to the one
faced by domestic investor and share the same trading rules. The standard asymmetry between
domestic and foreign assets is therefore dampened, and foreign investment is enhanced. Column (7)
of Table 3 will represent the baseline specication for further robustness checks (Section 4.3), and
the benchmark regression when dealing with endogeneity issues (Section 5).
10We have also included past 5-year return and past 3-year returns, with no signicant e¤ect on our ndings.
11As an alternative, we have included time-invariant institutional variables drawn from La Porta et al. (1998):
"control of the risk of expropriation", that seizes the government stance towards business, and "e¢ ciency of the
judicial system" in attracting foreign investments. Our ndings are not a¤ected by this alternative denition of
country governance.
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4.3 Robustness and sensitivity
In Table 4 to 9, we run robustness checks, sensitivity analyses, and interaction tests. We consider
di¤erent specications or country sample, and investigate the role of crises and regulation reforms
(Table 4), perform sensitivity analyses on the exchange consolidation denition (Table 5), study the
interaction e¤ects with the consolidation index (Tables 6 and 7), explore alternative econometric
specications (Table 8), and the treatment of outliers (Table 9).
4.3.1 Additional controls and sample specication
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we control for additional country-specic factors potentially
correlated with the included covariates.
Recent literature has stressed the e¤ect of minority shareholder protection on foreign investment
(Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013b)). We therefore include the
"revised" antidirector rights index (Djankov et al. (2008)), a measure that revises the antidirector
rights index (ADR) proposed in the seminal paper by La Porta et al. (1998), and that captures how
strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders
in the corporate decision making process. Consistent with the literature, the e¤ect of the revised
ADR of the destination economy on foreign investment is positive (column (1), Table 4). Expectedly,
the inclusion of the revised ADR index reduces the role played by the "common law" legal origin of
the destination country, as they both proxy the degree of protection of minority investors, and then
play a similar role on foreign investment. Compared to the baseline specication, its inclusion has a
very marginal e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of the EClj factor (from 0.316 to 0.318).12
The role of stock exchange consolidation may depend upon the level of nancial openness of the
national stock exchanges before the merger. We consider as a measure of openness, the percentage
of foreign securities traded on the domestic market (relative to the domestic share) in 2000, prior to
12As pointed out in the literature, the direction of causality between the index of minority shareholder rights and
nancial development, as captured for instance by the stock market capitalization, is ambiguous (La Porta et al.
(1998)). This potentially creates a problem of endogeneity, because the market capitalization enters as denominator
of the dependent variable. Given the modest impact of the revised ADR on the coe¢ cient of the EClj variable, we
will therefore not include it in the baseline specication, in order to prevent unnecessary sources of endogeneity.
19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899436
the period considered in our analysis. Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results after including a
measure of openness for both the destination and the investing country. The coe¢ cients are negative
and statistically signicant only at 10%, and their inclusion reduces the coe¢ cient of EClj (from
0.316 to 0.280).13
In column (3) of Table 4, we allow for a nonlinear inuence of gravity variables on foreign
investment. We add the square of the two continuous gravity variables considered (being binary
the other gravity variables considered), i.e., the geographical distance and the accountingdistance
(GAAP). The positive and signicant coe¢ cients of the squared terms point to a nonlinear e¤ect of
these variables on foreign bias: interestingly, the strength of the negative e¤ect seems to decelerate
with extreme values of the distance. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the main variable of interest,
EClj, is however left almost una¤ected by the nonlinearity of gravity variables (from 0.316 to 0.311).
Finally, we test the robustness of our ndings to the sample specication. In column (4), we
exclude potential o¤shore nancial centres, which might have the e¤ect of distorting investorsdeci-
sions for reasons beyond the scope of this analysis. We exclude Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, Hong
Kong, United Kingdom and Uruguay.14 We observe that the coe¢ cient of the consolidation variable
is boosted (0.459), after the exclusion of potential o¤shore centers diverting foreign investments.
4.3.2 Crisis and regulation
The time period we consider may be non-neutral for our ndings, since it encompasses the global
nancial crisis and the evolution of nancial market regulation in major economies. These events need
to be accounted for, both because they might have had a direct impact on international diversication
incentives, and, more importantly, because these factors can a¤ect the way international portfolios
respond to stock exchange consolidation.
During the global nancial crisis of 2007-2009, an unprecedented large number of nancial insti-
13The inclusion of this covariate a¤ects the coe¢ cient of EClj but not dramatically, while entails a substantial loss
of observations (by about two thousands). We chose therefore not to include it in the baseline specication.
14Note that, in the light of the concerns of third-country holdings and round-tripping in the CPIS survey mentioned
above, and consistently with the literature (Lane (2006)), Luxemburg is excluded from our sample, either as a source
or a destination country, in view of its predominant role as an o¤shore center.
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tutions collapsed or were bailed out by governments.
In 2010, with increasing fear of excessive sovereign debt, lenders demanded higher interest rates
from eurozone states with high debt and decit levels, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and
subsequently, Italy. During this crisis, several of these countries had their sovereign debt downgraded
to junk status by international credit rating agencies, worsening investor fears.
Column (5a) of Table 4 reports the results of an econometric specication including a time
dummy for the 2007-2009 crisis, and its interaction term with the EClj index. Column (5b) of
Table 4, extends the crisis period to encompass also the 20102012 sovereign debt crisis.15 We can
observe that neither the coe¢ cient of the crisis periods, nor their interaction with EClj is statistically
signicant.
In the time span of our analysis, major changes also occurred in the regulatory framework of
developed economies.
In the aftermath of a number of high-prole scandals, in 2002 the United StatesCongress passed
the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). The Act is the most important legislation a¤ecting corporate nan-
cial reporting enacted in the United States since the 1930s. It not only imposed additional disclosure
requirements, but more importantly, proposed substantive corporate governance mandates.
In response, major economies emulated the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the related rules adopted by
US exchanges and securities regulators.16
While the welfare impact of more stringent securities legislation is still under debate, these manda-
tory statutes brought about deep changes on the regulatory and supervisory framework, which might
have a¤ected our ndings.
We construct a binary variable for the nancial system regulation, which is equal to 1 for the
countries involved, in the relevant years, and 0 otherwise. In column (6a) of Table 4, we check for a
direct e¤ect of this variable on foreign investment and its indirect e¤ect through the stock exchange
consolidation. We nd no e¤ect of the SOX legislation on foreign bias, but its interaction with EClj
15Note that, to estimate the e¤ect of the crisis, the specications in columns (5a) and (5b) of Table 4 do not include
time-xed e¤ects.
16In Appendix A.2, we specify the legislative measures adopted by various countries at di¤erent times.
21
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899436
appears negative and signicant. This evidence can be interpreted as the exchange consolidation
being especially e¤ective as an incentive to foreign investment in those countries lacking transparency
and strict regulatory norms.
Another important legislative act in the period under consideration might crucially have a¤ected
our ndings, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The MiFID is a directive,
taking e¤ect in November 2007, aiming at integrating the European Unions nancial markets, and
increasing the amount of cross border investment orders. The MiFID planned to implement new
measures, such as pre- and post-trade transparency requirements and capital requirements that
rms must hold. The new environment created by the MiFID could trigger drastic changes in the
architecture of capital markets, and in the organization of nancial intermediation in Europe. A
major feature of MiFID is, in fact, to open the execution and settlement of equity transactions to
a variety of operators, through competing trading venues, in order to foster competition. Since
this could potentially lead to a more fragmented and opaque infrastructure, then best execution
requirements, increased transparency and information are demanded for the benet of market and
to protect investors.
Results in column (6b) of Table 4, show that countries that adopted the MiFID Directive at-
tract more foreign investment, but the MiFID does not operate indirectly through stock exchange
consolidation, as revealed by the non signicant coe¢ cient of the interaction term.
4.3.3 Sensitivity to EC composition
In Table 5, we check the sensitivity of our ndings to the specication and composition of the
exchange consolidation index.
In column (1) of Table 5, we test for an alternative denition of the Euronext platform including
also the UK among the member countries. As mentioned above, in 2002, Euronext also merged with
the futures exchange LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange). Since
LIFFE is not strictly a stock exchange, the decrease in the coe¢ cient size (0.246) was expected and
can be interpreted as supportive of our thesis.
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In October 2006 the OMX Group also took a 10 per cent stake in Oslo Holding ASA, the owner
of Oslo Stock Exchange. In column (2) of Table 5, we specify the OMX platform as including also
Norway from 2007 onward, and the coe¢ cient of the EClj factor becomes even larger than in the
baseline regression (0.484).
Finally, we test whether our ndings are driven by a particular stock exchange merger.
In columns (3a) to (3e) of Table 5, we display the results when NYSE Euronext, Nasdaq OMX,
CEESEG, LSE-BI, or MILA consolidation are, respectively, excluded from the EClj indicator.
The results suggest that a single merger does not drive our results, but the coe¢ cients display a
notable variability after the exclusion of one of the consolidated platforms. Columns (3a) and (3b)
suggest, respectively, that the role of NYSE-Euronext is relatively weak, while the role of Nasdaq-
OMX is relatively strong.
To interpret this evidence, we need to acknowledge the existence of specic motives behind
individual mergers and, more generally, some peculiarities di¤erently a¤ecting cross-border holdings.
On the one hand, since the Euronext-NYSE group comprises relatively large exchanges, we can
conjecture that the size of member exchanges plays an adverse e¤ect on the sensitivity of cross-border
holdings to exchange consolidation.
On the other hand, the Nasdaq-OMX group is the result of a merger between two groups which
represented, before the consolidation, the principal suppliers of technology to stock markets, in their
respective continents (Bottiglia et al. (2010)). The model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006),
dealing with dual listing, emphasizes that the types of rms that are likely to take advantage of dual
listing are those about which foreign investors have a signicant amount of information available
to them.17 Consistently with the Rochet and Tirole (2004)s theory of the two-sided competition
for exchanges, the more attractive it is for rms to list on the exchange, the more attractive it is
for investors to trade on the exchange. Accordingly, we might expect in the Nasdaq-OMX group,
a strong incentive of rms to be listed in a foreign exchange where a stronger attraction is exerted
on investors by more "familiar" foreign rms: since these rms share characteristics similar to the
17Accordingly, Blass and Yafeh (2000) nd that high-tech rms from Israel are more likely to be listed on the
Nasdaq.
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domestic ones, the investors have a cost advantage in evaluate them (Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(2006)).
Following the above reasoning, we conjecture that some country characteristics of member coun-
tries, such as size or familiarity in a broader sense, might make the e¤ect of one stock exchange
merger more e¤ective than another.
4.3.4 EC and size
Table 6 reports the results of the interaction of EClj with the size of investing and destination
countries.
We focus rst on the measure more strictly related to the stock market, that is, the number of
publicly listed companies (columns (1a) and (1b)).
In column (1a) of Table 6, we consider the number of publicly listed companies in the investing
stock exchange. The coe¢ cient of EClj is equal to 0.389, the coe¢ cient of the (relative) investing
countrys size measure is non signicant, while the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is -0.027: the
e¤ect of the bilateral consolidation index EClj is decreasing in the relative size of the investing
countrys stock exchange. When considering the size of the destination economys stock exchange,
we observe that in general foreign investors underweight relatively large stock exchanges (-0.018),
and the negative coe¢ cient of the interaction e¤ect conrms that the bilateral consolidation index
EClj is decreasing also in the relative size of the destination countrys stock exchange.
The second size measure is GDP, and is more generally related to the size of the economy (columns
(2a) and (2b) of Table 6).
The results are qualitatively similar to the ones in columns (1a) and (1b), as the larger is the
size of destination and investing countries, the weaker is the e¤ect of stock exchange consolidation.
Interestingly, the negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term is half than in columns (1a) and (1b),
which is not surprising being the GDP, a measure more loosely related to the size of the stock
exchange.
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4.3.5 EC and familiarity
Beyond the size of the economies, their "familiarity" or "closeness" might also play a role. In Table 7,
we study whether closer countries benet more or less from joining a common platform. We consider
variables capturing physical, cultural, institutional and economic distance.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we consider among gravity variables, the classical measures
of physical distance. The coe¢ cient of the interaction is negative for distance and positive for the
border dummy: the EClj e¤ect is therefore stronger the closer are the member countries. In column
(3), (5) and (6) we observe that, similarly to what observed for physical distance, the EClj e¤ect is
stronger for countries closer in cultural terms (language, colonial linkages, legal origin). In column
(4), instead, we observe that the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative: the common currency
makes the EClj e¤ect weaker. This evidence can also contribute to explain the results of column (3a)
of Table 5, revealing the weaker e¤ectiveness of NYSE-Euronext -involving many EMU members- on
foreign investment. Columns (7) and (8) take into account the familiarity among countries in terms
of nancial linkages: countries with more distant accounting principles (GAAP) or lower historical
cross-listing ties display a weaker EClj e¤ect on foreign investments.
Finally, column (9) of Table 7 takes into account the closeness of countries in terms of trade
ows. Saudagaran (1988) and Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) nd a strong association between the
foreign listing location of a given rm and the level of its exports to that country. As mentioned
above, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) predict in their model that the rms that will mostly
take advantage of dual listing are those about which foreign investors have a signicant amount of
information available to them, for instance, because they purchase the goods exported by these rms.
Consistently, our ndings suggest that closeness in terms of goods markets is signicantly associated
with closeness in nancial markets, as it translates into larger cross-border investments.18
The contribution of Tables 6 and 7 is two-fold. On the one hand, the evidence that small
exchange size and strong familiarity sharpens the e¤ect of consolidation help understand the strong
18Recall that the cross-listing and the trade closeness indexes range theorically from 0 to 1. The large size of the
coe¢ cient of the interaction terms reects therefore the two extreme values they can take (0, in case of no bilateral
cross listing or trade, and 1, in the case all cross-listing or trade ows of country j are with country l):
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role played by consolidations such as Nasdaq-OMX, relative to NYSE-Euronext: indeed, abstracting
from the US which is present in both consolidation processes with two di¤erent exchanges, the OMX
member countries are relatively smaller and "closer" in nancial and cultural terms, compared with
the Euronext ones. On the other hand, these tables provide useful hints to dene the candidate
instruments for exchange consolidation, which will be further discussed in Section 5.
4.3.6 Sensitivity to the econometric specication
In Table 8, we undergo our results to sensitivity checks relative to the econometric specication.
Column (1) of Table 8 reports the results of the baseline regression (Table 3, column (7)), but under
a Tobit rather than a FGLS model: since a large number of bilateral observations is equal to zero, we
allow for the possibility that the observed distribution of equity holdings is censored at zero. Such
censoring is plausible, given the restrictions on shorting equity holdings in many countries. However,
as reported by the IMF, in some cases within the CPIS, negative values are reported for the value of
residentsholdings of securities issued by a particular economy. Such entries reect short positions
in securities, usually resulting from the sale of securities acquired under repurchase agreements.19
Though lower than in the baseline specication (from 0.316 to 0.201), the results under the Tobit
specication conrm that exchange consolidation is associated with a signicantly larger foreign bias.
In column (2), we run a Generalized Least Squares Model estimation specifying a log link and a
Negative Binomial distribution of residuals: this model can t a skewed distribution, a high ination
of zeros and overdispersion, which is the case of our dependent variable, as shown in Table 1. We
observe that the coe¢ cient of the EClj factor is positive, statistically signicant and equal to 0.214.
The results in column (1) and (2) of Table 8 show, on the one hand, that the exchange consolidation
e¤ect survives to alternative econometric specications, and, on the other hand, that when taking
into account the skewness of the distribution and the presence of zeros, the size of the coe¢ cient is
dampened, though remaining still large and signicant.
19Since in our country sample, the number of negative positions would be very low (less than 50 out of about
12 thousands of observations), and their absolute value would be very low, too, we exclude these observations, for
consistency with the theoretical framework.
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To address the issue of skewness of the distribution and the presence of outliers in the dependent
variable, in columns (3a) to (3d) of Table 8, we report the results of a Quantile regression. An advan-
tage of the quantile regression relative to the least squares regression is precisely that the quantile
regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the response measurements: whereas the
method of least squares estimates the conditional mean of the response variable, quantile regression
estimates its conditional median (or other quantiles). In columns (3a), (3b), (3c) and (3d) we re-
port, respectively, the conditional 25th percentiles, median, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of
the response variable.20 We observe that the coe¢ cient of the EClj factor varies across percentiles,
increasing from 0.156 to 0.282, to reduce then to 0.234 at the 90th percentile. In the next table, we
will more directly investigate how far the presence of outliers and zeros a¤ect the conditional mean
of the response variable.
4.3.7 Sensitivity to outlierstreatment
The evidence of Table 8 suggests the need to properly address the issue of outliers. We will handle
them both by winsorizing data, that is, replacing the extreme values with a certain percentile value
from each end, and by trimming (or truncating) data, that is, removing those extreme values from
the distribution.
If we consider the truncated distribution, we take a clear stance and decide that we are not
interested in the tails of the distribution, because we believe that the "outliers" are anomalous, and
we want to focus on the "true" distribution. If we consider instead the winsorized sample, we think
the outliers belong to the distribution, but we want to reduce the skewness of the distribution, and
then replace their extreme values with the upper (lower) values taken by the distribution. It is
worth stressing that the treatment of outliers is usually symmetrical, that is the winsorization or
truncation involves both the top and the bottom of the distribution. In our case, since the lowest
15% of the distribution consists of zeros, our treatment will be necessarily asymmetrical. In the case
of winsorization, we can only operate on the upper part of the distribution. In the case of truncation,
20Note that the bottom 15% of the distribution of the dependent variable is represented by zeros.
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conversely, we can either ignore the low end of the distribution and then trimming only the top, or
we can trim the high end and all the zeros of the distribution. We will proceed both ways.
In Table 9, we handle the outliers by winsorizing (column (1) and (2)), or by truncating (columns
(3a) to (4b)) the distribution according to the rule shown at the head of the column. From columns
(1) and (2), we observe that a winsorization of the sample at top 1% or 5%, leads to a coe¢ cient of
the EClj factor equal to 0.327 and 0.221, respectively. The fact that the coe¢ cient in column (1) is
larger than the coe¢ cient of the baseline regression (0.316) suggests that in the upper 1 percent of
the distribution many outliers refer to country pairs not involved in the consolidation process: their
winsorization makes the exchange consolidation e¤ect even stronger. When instead the winsorization
process involves the upper 5 percent of the distribution, it leads to a reduction of the coe¢ cient of
the EClj factor: it evidently curtails the outliers related to consolidating country pairs.
Columns (3a) and (3b) refer to the results when the distribution is truncated at the top 1%
only, and at the top 1% plus all zeros, respectively. Similarly to what found in column (1), when
focusing on the top 1%, the outliers seem to refer proportionally more to countries not involved
in the merger of exchanges, and this further reinforces the coe¢ cient of the EClj factor. When
considering instead the last two columns (4a and 4b), the results highlight again that the top 5% of
the distributions includes a substantial presence of outliers related to country pairs involved in the
merger: the coe¢ cient of EClj is halved compared with the baseline regression, though the e¤ect
remains statistically signicant and economically relevant.
It is worth emphasizing that handling the outliers, either through winsorizing or trimming, on
the one hand, boosts the tting of the model, as captured by the adjusted R2, and, on the other
hand, likely provides the distribution with more desirable statistical properties and robust statistics,
as discussed in the instrumental variable analysis in the next section.
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5 Endogeneity of the exchange consolidation
According to the empirical evidence shown so far, the exchange consolidation appears strongly pos-
itively associated with cross-border investment. The direction of causality between consolidation
and cross-border holdings can go either way. Such an evidence indeed can be interpreted as a stock
exchange consolidation being a response to increasing cross-border investments and, subsequently,
becoming a means to further promote them. If, on the one hand, the process of exchange consoli-
dation can lead to stronger cross-country investment due to the reduction of transaction costs, on
the other hand, strong nancial linkages, captured by cross-border holdings, can expedite exchange
consolidation by reducing the trading costs of existing cross-border traders.
We are aware that disentangling directions of causality can represent an overwhelming challenge,
especially in macroeconomics studies, because economic and nancial systems are strongly inter-
twined and it is almost impossible to unravel one-way only, or even just preferred, routes. With
these caveats in mind, in the remainder of the paper, we will proceed to investigate further the
consolidation process, in order to shed some light on the role of the event, and to identify, drawing
from related theoretical frameworks, exogenous factors potentially leading to an agreement on the
merger of stock exchanges.
5.1 An event-study approach
To preliminarily investigate the issue, we follow an event-study approach by exploiting the staggered
nature of the consolidation processes, i.e., the fact that the mergers are completed, or progressively
include new members, at di¤erent points in time.
In Table 10, we include country-pair xed-e¤ects for countries undergoing an exchange consolida-
tion process in the same platform (e.g., fe_EClj=1 for Mexico and Colombia in every point in time,
regardless of the year they join the same platform), to control for unobservable country-pair linkages
not captured by the covariates included in the regression. The "pure" consolidation event is instead
equal to 1 only after the consolidation (e.g., p_EClj=1 for Mexico and Colombia only after they both
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join the same platform), that is, p_EClj = fe_EClj  time_event, where the dummy time_event
is equal to 1 after the merger, and 0 before. Notice that the construction of the binary variable
p_EClj coincides with the denition of EClj used so far, but, after the inclusion of the country-
pair xed e¤ect fe_EClj, its coe¢ cient captures the specic reaction of foreign investment to the
consolidation event, on top of the time-invariant xed-e¤ect fe_EClj. If the coe¢ cient of p_EClj
is statistically signicant, it means that, on top of the unobservable linkages that can exist within
the pair-countries involved in the merger and captured by fe_EClj, the consolidation event per se
has tilted the bilateral cross-border investments, thus providing indirect support to the existence of
causality going from the event to the response variable.
In column (1) of Table 10, we report the results of a regression following the baseline specication
(Table 3, column (7)), in which the consolidation is captured by the two binary variables described
above, p_EClj and fe_EClj. We observe that, on top of the xed-e¤ect equal to 0.215, the p_EClj
factor, contributes to increase the foreign bias by 0.116. Since we have shown in Tables 8 and 9 that
the presence of outliers drastically modies the e¤ect of exchange consolidation on foreign investment,
in columns (2) to (5b), we replicate the same analysis of column (1), on the winsorized and truncated
distributions. We observe that, after di¤erently handling the outliers, the "pure" consolidation event
p_EClj acquires an even larger importance relative to the fe_EClj xed-e¤ect, up to becoming more
than twice as large, in the 5% truncated distribution (columns (5a) and (5b)).
5.2 The determinants of EC
5.2.1 A theoretical framework
In this section, we formally deal with the endogeneity of the exchange consolidation process. While
the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of stock exchange mergers is still scarce,
a vast literature is available on cross-listing. Although cross-listing is di¤erent from a stock exchange
merger, it shares many analogies with the exchange consolidation process, and can therefore provide
us with a suggestive theoretical framework.
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Domowitz et al. (1998), dealing with costs and benets of cross-listing of the Mexican equity
market, point out the fundamental role of intermarket information. They nd that when markets are
informationally linked, the precision of intermarket price information signals is high and, therefore,
the entry by new investors following cross-listing improves the measures of market quality in both
markets. Conversely, if the precision of signals across the two markets is very low, that is markets
are not informationally linked, international cross-listing results in migration of investors away from
the domestic exchange (diversion of order ow abroad), which is not a desirable outcome.
In line with this reasoning, we can imagine that the contracting parties, when deciding the merger,
will carefully take into account costs and benets of the consolidation process. Indeed, beyond the
xed costs in terms of homogenization of the procedures, the consolidation process needs to take into
account the incentives for the involved exchanges, and in particular the risk of diversion of investment
from domestic rms to equivalent foreign rms. Accordingly, we might expect that a consolidation
process is more likely to occur when the level of information in both markets is high enough.
The theoretical model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) studies the rms choice about the
exchange to list equity and the exchangeschoice of listing standards. Interestingly for our purposes,
they also develop a model for competition and cooperation among exchanges which analyzes their
incentives to merge to ameliorate their competitive position, and predicts that under certain con-
ditions, a merger between two exchanges may result in a higher listing standard for the combined
exchange relative to that of either of the merging exchanges. The key factor in their model is the
improvement in (costly) information available in the consolidated exchange compared to the two
distinct ones and, in particular, the ability of traders to e¢ ciently produce information to evaluate a
listed rm. These predictions, would go in the same directions as in Domowitz et al. (1998), identi-
fying a crucial role of market information produced by the investors trading in the stock exchanges.
As an implication, the model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) predicts that, through a merger
process, smaller exchanges can improve their competitive position against a third larger exchange by
merging and thereby pooling their informed investor base.
From these theoretical contributions, we draw some testable conjectures: we expect that, on the
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one hand, the small size, and, on the other hand, the information depth of the involved stock markets
can structurally inuence the probability of the merger.
5.2.2 Discussion on the instruments
To be able to assess a causal link between stock exchange consolidation and foreign investments, it is
not enough to nd variables driving the exchange merger, but we need these variable not to directly
a¤ect cross-border investment, but only through the exchange consolidation.
According to the theoretical framework described above, we conjecture that a valid instrument
must be structurally connected with the agreement process to the merger by the two contracting
exchanges, and therefore can be related to the size and the depth of market information in the stock
exchanges.
Let us consider, rst, the role of market information. One can expect that more informationally
deep markets attract more inward investments, thus directly a¤ecting the response variable and then
invalidating the instrument. The depth of information of the investing economys stock exchange
could instead, ex-ante, induce more or less foreign investment. It is worth recalling that in our re-
gression specication, we already explicitly control for the turnover ratio of investing and destination
countries: this is commonly recognized as a measure of market liquidity, which in turn, is correlated
with market information. Regardless of the balance of positive and negative e¤ects, we acknowledge
it can directly a¤ect foreign investment.
Lets now consider instead a 0-1 variable capturing whether both exchanges in a country-pair
feature an informationally deep stock exchange. It is now less straightforward to nd a direct link
to foreign portfolio bias: if more informed markets attract more inward investment, this attraction
should hold regardless of the degree of information on the investing country. On the contrary, the
joint high information of the exchanges can make the merger more likely, because of the incentives
of listing rms to be part of a consolidated platform to increase their informed investorsbase, thus
creating the ideal conditions for an agreement. If the joint high information of the exchanges is
proven to inuence the probability of the merger, then it could be a candidate instrument, because
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we expect this factor to inuence foreign portfolio investment not directly, but only through favouring
the success of the merger.
We follow a similar reasoning for the role of the exchange size. In our regression specication, we
already explicitly control for the dimension of the investing/destination economy, as captured by the
number of listed shares and by the GDP. Di¤erent predictions can be made on the role the size can
play on foreign investment: on the one hand, in standard gravity models, the larger the economies
the larger should be the investments; on the other hand, small countries should invest more abroad
for diversication reasons.21 In any case, regardless of the balance of positive and negative e¤ects,
we allow for the size to directly a¤ect foreign investment.
Lets now consider instead a 0-1 variable capturing whether both exchanges in a country-pair
have a small size. It is now less straightforward to nd a direct link to foreign portfolio bias: for
diversication motives, we can expect small countries to invest more abroad, but not necessarily in
small countries. On the contrary, the small size of the exchanges can make the merger more likely,
since the contracting countries have higher incentives to create a more competitive exchange to
attract listed rms and increase the informed investorsbase. If the joint small size of the exchanges
is proven to inuence the probability of the merger, then it could be a candidate instrument, because
we expect this factor to inuence foreign portfolio investment not directly, but only by increasing
the probability of the merger.
Moreover, the size of the exchanges can also a¤ect the probability of the merger because of
exogenous anti-trust supervisory controls on the agreement. Indeed, some mergers, though rated
convenient and benecial by the contracting parties, have been blocked by supranational authorities,
because of concerns about the violation of the concentration norms.22 The fact that the involved
exchanges are small enough makes indeed the consolidation process also viable on a regulatory view
point. While we are not able to disentangle the two interpretations of the joint small size, it a¤ects the
21Moreover, since in our analysis the dependent variable is not the foreign investment, but its ratio to market share,
any prediction is even less obvious.
22Notable recent examples of merger blocks have been carried on by the European Commission for violation of the
European Competition Law: in 2012, the block of the merger between the NYSE Euronext Inc. and the Deutsche
Borse AG; in 2017, the block of the merger between the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse, after two failed
attempts in 2000 and 2005.
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response variable not directly, but only through the success of the merger, and therefore it represents
a potentially valid instruments for the exchange consolidation.
5.3 Instrumental variable regression
5.3.1 Candidate excluded instruments
The excluded instruments must be strong and exogenous. To nd strong instruments, we search
for measures of size and information which are strictly connected with the stock markets. To nd
exogenous instruments, we need them to seize the mechanisms behind the agreement to ensure the
latter is the only channel through which the instruments a¤ect foreign investments.
The endogenous variable, EClj is dichotomic. Following the theoretical framework described
above, we propose dichotomic instruments related with the joint size and information of the stock
markets involved, taking into account their driving role in the agreement.
We propose the following instruments: J_small_sizelj and J_high_infolj, where "J" stands for
"joint", and the subscript lj signals that the dummy variable refers to both the investing and the
destination country, a pre-requisite for this variable to inuence the agreement process.
Lets start from the rst instrument capturing the joint small size of the exchanges in the country-
pair. A bilateral-specic 0-1 variable is constructed, considering the market capitalization of the
investing and destination stock exchange. This variable is equal to 1 if both the investing and
the destination country have a low exchange capitalization, i.e., if both their market capitalization
are below the mean, and 0 otherwise.23 As underlined above, if the condition is jointly met by
both countries, it facilitates the agreement on the merger, and can a¤ect the response variable only
through the exchange consolidation channel. We recall that our baseline specication also includes
country-specic size measures captured by GDP and number of listed shares (at their beginning of
period levels), which are allowed, instead, to directly a¤ect foreign investment.
The second instrument is aimed at capturing the depth of information in the stock exchanges.
23To avoid endogeneity problems, we construct this variable considering the validity of these conditions at their
beginning of period values.
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We rely on the literature studying the linkages between information and attention-grabbing stocks.
Barber and Odean (2008) underline that attention is a scarce resource, and when there are many
alternatives, options that attract attention are more likely to be considered. van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2010) predict that investors should pay more attention to the assets that have a
higher squared Sharpe ratio and market capitalization, and more recently Gargano and Rossi (2018)
conrm that investors pay more attention to stocks of companies with a larger market capitalization.
Yuan (2015) highlight that investorsattention is mostly attracted by more visible indexes, and that
market-wide attention events raise the attention level investors pay to their portfolios, causing them
to become more active in processing information and making trade decisions.
Accordingly, to capture the joint high information in the exchanges within the country-pair,
we consider the average market capitalization of the stock listed in each country index, i.e., the
domestic market capitalization divided by number of listed shares. Listed stocks with larger market
capitalization, being associated with more visibility, in line with Yuan (2015), will raise the attention
of the investors, then enhancing the production of information in the market.
Relying on this measure, a bilateral-specic 0-1 variable is constructed, considering the average
market capitalization of listed stocks in the investing and destination country. This variable is equal to
1 if both the investing and the destination country have a large market capitalization per stock listed,
i.e., if it is placed above the mean, and 0 otherwise. As discussed above, if this condition is jointly
met by both countries, it can ease the agreement on the merger, and can a¤ect the response variable
through the exchange consolidation channel. We recall that our baseline specication also includes
country-specic liquidity measures captured by the respective turnover ratios (at their beginning of
period levels), which are allowed, instead, to directly a¤ect foreign investment.
5.3.2 GMM and instrumentsvalidity tests
As anticipated above, to be good instruments, the candidate variables described above, beyond being
economically sound, must possess two basic statistical properties: they must be highly correlated
with the endogenous variable (i.e., the hypothesis of weak explanatory power of instruments must be
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rejected), and uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., the hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument
must not be rejected).
Since our system has one endogenous variable and two candidate instruments, our system is
overly identied: we can therefore test, beyond the hypothesis of weakness, also the hypothesis of
exogeneity of the instruments.
In Table 11, we report our IV estimates when the EClj endogenous dummy regressor is instru-
mented by the two excluded instruments described above.
In column (1) of Table 11, we report the results of the FGLS regression as in the baseline
specication of Table 3, column (7). In columns (2a) to (2c) we report the rst stage of the endogenous
regressors, considering one instrument at a time (columns (2a) and (2b)), and both instruments
together (column (2c)). Column 3 reports the second stage of the overidentied system estimated
through a GMM, where the endogenous regressors is instrumented by the two excluded instruments
above described.
Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), we estimate the rst stage in columns (2a) to (2c) through
a Linear Probability Model (LPM). A LPM works like a normal linear regression model, but the
interpretation changes, because the dependent variable is binary: the coe¢ cient represents the change
in the probability that the dependent variable equals one for a one-unit change of the independent
variable of interest, holding everything else constant. Taking in mind that the coe¢ cient estimated
through LPM is only an approximation of the average marginal e¤ect, we can interpret the coe¢ cient
of the excluded instruments as follows. When considering one instrument at a time, we observe that
countries with a joint high level of information in the stock market (J_High_infolj = 1) have a
3.9% higher probability of undergoing an exchange consolidation process than pair-countries for
which this condition is not satised (column (2a)). By comparing the relevance of its coe¢ cient to
other determinants, we observe that it is about a half of the common border, close to the common
currency, and larger than the cross-listing variable. When considering the second instrument, we
observe that countries with a joint small size of the exchanges (J_Low_sizelj = 1) have a a 2.4%
higher probability of undergoing an exchange consolidation process than pair-countries for which
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this condition is not met (column (2b)). By comparing the relevance of its coe¢ cient to other
determinants, we observe that it is one-forth of the common border, half of the common currency,
and two-thirds of the cross-listing variable.
When both excluded instruments are considered (column (2c)), their role in the rst stage is
only marginally a¤ected: countries with a high joint information and a joint small size of exchanges
exhibit an increase in the probability of the merger by 4.1% and 2.5%, respectively.
Interestingly, more distant accounting principles (GAAP) increase the probability of a stock
exchange merger: this result can be interpreted as countries with distant nancial accounting rules
having a higher incentive to homogenize their trading rules in order to ease reciprocal investments.
At the bottom of columns (2a), (2b) and (2c), we report the F-statistics that assess the relevance
of the instruments, by checking the strength of the correlation between the endogenous regressor and
its (excluded) instrument.24
To reject the hypothesis of weak instruments, Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that the F-
statistics should be larger than 10. In a more recent paper, Stock and Yogo (2005) provide details on
the critical values for the weak instrument test, based on the number of endogenous regressors and
excluded instruments. In our case, the critical value is equal to 19.93: the F-statistics unequivocally
reject the hypothesis of weak instruments.
In column (3), we report the estimates after the endogenous regressor is instrumented by the two
variables just discussed, following a GMM approach. We can immediately notice that the size of
the coe¢ cient of EClj is positive, statistically signicant, but disproportionally large (4.711). At the
bottom of the second stages column, we also report the tests of the overidentifying restrictions. Both
the 2 relative to the standard Hansen test (J-test) and the 2 relative to the its heteroskedasticity-
robust counterpart (H-R test) (Wooldridge (2002), pp. 122-124) reject the hypothesis of exogeneity
of the excluded instruments.
These ndings are not surprising. It is well known that the classical instrumental-variables es-
timator is extremely sensitive to the presence of outliers in the sample (Dehon et al. (2015)): they
24In columns (2a) and (2b), where the number of instruments is equal to one, the F-statistics is equal to the square
of the t-statistics.
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are likely responsible of the very large coe¢ cient of the endogenous regressor, and produce large
residuals which, in turn, produce the high 2 statistics leading to the failure of the overidentifying
restrictionstests.
In Table 12, we replicate the same analysis as in Table 11, but relative to the truncated distribution
at top 5% and zeros.25
In column (1) of Table 12, we report the results of the FGLS regression, as in the corresponding
specication of Table 9, column (4b). The rst stage results (columns (2a), (2b), and (2c)) show
that the coe¢ cients of the joint high information instrument is close to 0.03, while the coe¢ cient
of the joint small size of the stock exchanges is about 0.02: a high joint information and a joint
small size of exchanges determine an increase in the probability of the merger by 3% and 2%,
respectively.26 The F-test for the relevance of the instruments strongly rejects the hypothesis of
weakness of the instruments. In column (3), we report the GMMs second stage of the overidentied
system estimated on the truncated distribution: the coe¢ cient of the endogenous regressor is equal
to 0.324, a value close to the magnitude observed throughout the analysis performed so far. The
instrumentsexogeneity tests reported at the bottom, both the J-test (0.22) and the H-R test (0.45),
do not reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments, thus conrming the statistical validity
of the proposed instruments.27
While the statistical tests provide support to the choice of the proposed instruments, we challenge
their validity with a counterfactual test.
In Table 13, we perform the same analysis as in Table 12, on the same truncated sample, but
with a crucial variation in the construction of the instruments.
25In Table 14 (Appendix B), we report the same regression relative to the sample truncated only at the top 5%
(with all zeros kept in the distribution). The size of the coe¢ cients and the instrumentsvalidity tests are very close
to the ones presented in Table 12.
26Notice that the truncation of the distribution implies, consistently, a recomputation of the cross-country mean
needed as a benchmark to construct the instrumentsbinary variables.
27Table 15 (Appendix B) reports the relevant coe¢ cients of EClj (in the FGLS and in the GMMs second stage) and
of the instruments (in the rst stage), across di¤erent treatments of outliers, following the winsorizing and truncation
structure of Table 9. The table shows that the IV estimation with the proposed instruments work e¤ectively for the
distribution truncated at the top 5%, regardless of the truncation of the zeros or not (Panel II.a and II.b), while for
other levels of truncation or winsorization the role played by the outliers jeopardizes the correct validity of the IV
method.
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As extensively argued above, the key ingredient of the proposed instruments resides in their
structural connection with the agreement on the merger by the two contracting countries: it is
precisely the joint nature of the instrument to dene its role in the agreement, and then its indirect
inuence on the response variable through the consolidation process.
If we break this joint nature, the agreement channel at the basis of the instruments should break
as well: a high depth of information, or a small size, of any of the two exchanges in the country-pair,
rather than of both of them, could indeed directly a¤ect the foreign bias -similarly to what observed
in our specication for the liquidity measure or the number of listed shares included as covariates-,
then potentially invalidating the instrument.
The two instruments adopted in Table 13, while relying upon the same data and the same
structure, di¤er uniquely by the absence of their joint nature: Or_High_infolj is binary variable
equal to 1 if any of the two exchanges has a large market capitalization of listed stocks, and 0
otherwise. Similarly, Or_Low_sizelj is a binary variable equal to 1 if any of the two exchanges has
a low size of the exchange, and 0 otherwise. The rst major di¤erence with Table 12 is that the
coe¢ cients of the two instruments in the rst stage are negative and statistically signicant (columns
(2a), (2b), and (2c)): the fact that any of the two countries in a pair has a small or an informationally
deep stock exchange makes the probability of the merger lower by 1% and 1.5%, respectively. Second,
the F-test of the instruments in the rst stage in column (2c) reveals a problem of weakness of the
instruments, if compared with the critical value 19.93 above mentioned. Moreover, when looking at
column (3), we observe that the coe¢ cient of the endogenous regressor in the GMM second stage
is not signicant, i.e., the proposed instruments are not valid. The non signicant coe¢ cient in
the second stage implies that the tted value of the rst stage, that is the predicted probability of
the merger, obtained using the counterfactual excluded instruments, is not helpful in explaining the
response variable.
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5.4 Implications for foreign investment
The investigation of the mechanisms driving the process of exchange mergers allows us to derive
interesting implications for foreign investments, thus complementing and completing the analysis.
Table 6 and 7 have shown that the e¤ect of the exchange consolidation is not even across countries,
and that it crucially depends on the size of the involved economies (the lower the size, the stronger
the e¤ect of consolidation on foreign bias, Table (6)), and on the "familiarity" among the countries
(the closer are the countries, the stronger the e¤ect of consolidation on foreign bias, Table (7)).
The results of the IV regression, provide us with an interpretative key also of these ndings.
Lets start with Table 6. As we have noticed in Section 4.3.4, the e¤ect of stock exchange
consolidation is stronger for investing and destination countries featuring a relative lower size, seized
by GDP or the number of listed rms. Now lets scrutinize these ndings from a di¤erent perspective.
The negative sign of the interaction, can also be interpreted the other way round: the e¤ect of the
size on foreign investment is a¤ected by the fact that two exchanges share the same platform. We
can notice that the size of the investing country negatively a¤ects the foreign bias only when the
consolidation dummy is equal to 1 (columns (1a) and (2a) of Table 6): this suggests that its e¤ect
on the response variable passes through the endogenous consolidation agreement. As far as the
destination economies are concerned, we observe that the size negatively a¤ects foreign bias directly,
but its negative e¤ect is about three times larger when considering its indirect impact through the
consolidation process.
This evidence supports, the hypothesis that the consolidation event is a cost-e¤ective incentive to
foreign investments: since the merger allows investors to access foreign securities at a lower cost, the
advantage is larger the smaller is the initial stock exchange size. On the other hand, it corroborates
the idea that the consolidation process, beyond its direct e¤ect on foreign bias, also plays an indirect
e¤ect by modifying the inuence of other variables, in this case number of listed shares and GDP,
on the response variable.
We similarly investigate the interaction of the consolidation with the "familiarity" variables. As
noticed in Table 7, the e¤ect of stock exchange consolidation is generally stronger for closer country
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pairs. Looking at the interactionscoe¢ cients from a di¤erent perspective, we observe that (with
the exception of EMU), sharing a common exchange platform makes the role of these variables on
foreign bias signicantly stronger. Standard gravity variables are shown to inuence foreign bias
in the expected direction, but their e¤ectiveness is sharpened for countries belonging to the same
exchange platform. Particularly interesting is the behavior of GAAP and cross-listing, variables
more strictly related to the nancial markets: their impact on foreign bias is signicant only for
country pairs belonging to the same exchange platform. The same evidence is found for the trade
closeness variable.28
The evidence relative to the di¤erent measures of familiarity suggest that they a¤ect foreign in-
vestment both directly and indirectly through stock exchange consolidation. Portes and Rey (2005)
underline that since transactions in nancial assets are "weightless", distance may only be found to
play a role if it has informational content. As far as the closeness variables are meant as proxies
for intermarket information, we observe that their e¤ect on cross-border investment is signicantly
steered by the exchange consolidation. Therefore, the depth of information, on the one hand, facili-
tates the merger agreement, and, on the other hand, through the exchange consolidation, inuences
more e¤ectively cross-border investments.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the e¤ect of stock exchange consolidation on foreign portfolio investment. The
establishment of these mergers can potentially lead to important benets for the stability of nancial
markets, as the standardization of trading platforms could reduce the likelihood of stock price jumps,
have a positive e¤ect on the information e¢ ciency of the stock market, and reduce the costs of cross-
border trading by increasing market liquidity (McAndrews and Stefanadis (2002); Yuna (2016);
Hellström et al. (2018)). Our ndings highlight indeed that joining a common stock exchange
platform enhances cross-border investments. Being the dependent variables distribution skewed and
28To better disentangle the role of the consolidation event, we report in Table 16 and 17 (Appendix B) the results
from a specication following the event-study approach of Table 10. The ndings are qualitatively similar to the ones
observed in Tables 6 and 7.
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with a high ination of zeros, we also run Quantile, Negative Binomial and Tobit regressions, and
handle the presence of outliers, through winsorization and truncation of the sample. The role of
exchange consolidation in explaining cross-border investment survives.
Finally, we deal with the endogeneity of the consolidation process. After instrumenting it by two
binary variables capturing the incentives of the stock exchanges to merge their joint high information
and their joint small size the results of the GMM regression and the instrumentsvalidity tests
corroborate our initial conjecture. Crucial for the exogeneity of our instruments is their role in the
agreement: the candidate instruments must a¤ect cross-border investments only indirectly, that is
by increasing the likelihood of the merger.
Our research on stock exchange mergers departs from previous works, focused on listed rms
and exchange shareholders, as it takes the stance of investors and spouses the investment barrier
perspective. This work shows that, foreign investors, more heavily a¤ected by investment barriers,
are sensitive to institutional changes such as a stock exchange merger, which reduces trading barriers,
and therefore enhances cross-border investments.
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Tables
Figure 1. Stock exchange consolidation
This gure represents the ve stock exchange mergers occurred in the time span considered, with details





















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Consolidated stock exchanges
48
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899436
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the regressors used in the
analysis. The subscript j refers to the destination country, the subscript l refers to the investing country,
the subscript lj refers to the country-pair lj, * indicates that the corresponding variable is included in the
analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
I. Dependent variable mean median st. dev. min max
Foreign stock market portfolio weight (wlj ) 0.003923 0.000085 0.015287 0.000000 0.314699
Market share (MSj ) 0.017432 0.003679 0.053207 0.000001 0.496470
Float-adjusted market share (MS_MSCIj ) 0.017438 0.003679 0.053245 0.000001 0.530595
Foreign bias (wlj /MS_MSCIj ) 0.404261 0.060166 1.464113 0.000000 26.700178
II. Pair-specific regressors
Stock exchange consolidation (EClj ) 0.013294 0 0.114533 0 1
- EURONEXT 0.005474 0 0.073785 0 1
- CEESEG 0.001760 0 0.041910 0 1
- OMX 0.004985 0 0.070432 0 1
- MILA 0.000635 0 0.025199 0 1
- LSE-BI 0.000440 0 0.020969 0 1
Distance, in Km (distlj ) 7444 7968 5004 60 19772
Common border (borderlj ) 0.045211 0 0.207769 0 1
Common language (langlj ) 0.087356 0 0.282361 0 1
Colonial linkage (colonylj ) 0.030268 0 0.171327 0 1
Equal legal origin (equal_lawlj ) 0.285441 0 0.451630 0 1
European Monetary Union (EMUlj ) 0.053886 0 0.225795 0 1
Generalized Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPlj ) 9.024378 9 3.159531 0 18
Cross listing (cross_listinglj /cross_listingj ) 0.017457 0 0.089885 0 1
Trade closeness (tradelj ) 0.019427 0.004675 0.046287 8.63E-07 0.795022
Instruments for endogenous EC lj
Joint High stock market information in l and j (J_High_infolj ) 0.088889 0 0.284587 0 1
Joint Low exchange size in l  and j (J_Low_sizelj ) 0.631478 1 0.482410 0 1
III. Country-specific regressors
International capital mobility (cap_mob* ) 4.557592 4.6 2.794185 0 9.230769
Common law (common_lawj ) 0.367347 0 0.482091 0 1
Revised Antidirector Rights Index (rev_ADRj ) 3.422414 3.5 1.142488 1 5
Lagged stock returns, % year-on-year (lag_retj ) 11.1593 7.249153 23.272010 -37.647500 258.561000
Gross Domestic Product, in US$ (GDP* ) 5.66E+11 1.36E+11 1.52E+12 6.23E+09 1.06E+13
Number of listed shares (listed_shares* ) 673 263 1166 17 6355
Stock exchange openness (exchange_openness* ) 0.110761 0.023856 0.184445 0.000000 0.675214
Turnover ratio (turnover ratio*) 59.428833 48.07501 64.270360 0.235442 497.402500
Traded stocks to GDP (traded stocksj /GDPj ) 52.456039 23.55292 81.871280 0.001551 741.587200
MIFID (MIFIDj ) 0.198870 0 0.399155 0 1
SOX (SOXj ) 0.268927 0 0.443407 0 1
Regulatory quality (reg_qual*) 3.213200 3.332994 0.868190 0.615085 4.760543
Control of corruption (contr_corr*) 3.096317 2.925679 1.092872 1.100438 5.085616
Descriptive statistics
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Table 2. Exchange consolidation and the stock market
This table reports the regression coe¢ cients of the stock exchange consolidation, when the dependent
variable is, alternatively, size, liquidity, domestic investment, foreign portfolio share (wlj), and foreign bias














wll wlj (wlj /MS_MSCIj )
(1a) (2a) (2b) (3) (4)          (5)
country j  (destination)
stock exchange
consolidation  (ECj )
0.030*** 0.253*** 0.266*** - 0.002***     -0.002
country l  (investing)
stock exchange
consolidation  (ECl )
- - - - -0.110*** 0.000***    -0.015
bilateral l-j  stock
exchange consolidation
(EClj )
- - - - - 0.009***     0.788***
controls: investing country








liquidity (destination) country j
50
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899436
Table 3. Main ndings
This table reports the results of a Feasible GLS regression. The dependent variable is the scaled foreign
portfolio (wlj/MS_MSCIj), where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l-destination
country j. Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average.
EClj is a bilateral-specic dychotomic variable identifying country-pairs belonging to same consolidated
stock exchange platform. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EClj 0.546 *** 0.530 *** 0.567 *** 0.330 *** 0.327 *** 0.352 *** 0.316 ***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.034 )
distlj -0.105 *** -0.082 *** -0.085 *** -0.143 *** -0.151 *** -0.146 *** -0.129 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 )
borderlj 0.438 *** 0.467 *** 0.421 *** 0.417 *** 0.425 *** 0.422 *** 0.428 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.023 )
langlj 0.124 *** 0.098 *** 0.109 *** 0.120 *** 0.118 *** 0.114 *** 0.077 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
EMUlj 0.590 *** 0.561 *** 0.544 *** 0.561 *** 0.546 *** 0.528 *** 0.542 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.035 )
equal_lawlj -0.019 ** -0.004 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 0.023 **
( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
common_lawj 0.094 *** 0.086 *** 0.077 *** 0.104 *** 0.113 *** 0.116 *** 0.096 ***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 )
colonylj 0.123 *** 0.110 *** 0.092 *** 0.074 *** 0.081 *** 0.086 *** 0.120 ***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 )
GDPl -0.024 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.024 *** -0.027 *** -0.028 *** -0.018 ***
( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
GDPj -0.020 *** -0.010 *** -0.013 *** 0.014 0.013 0.011 -0.010
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.014 )
listed sharesl 0.002 *** -0.002 ** -0.001 -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 ***
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
listed sharesj 0.012 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 0.003
( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
cap_mobl 0.124 *** 0.121 *** 0.109 *** 0.117 *** 0.118 *** 0.005
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 )
cap_mobj 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.059 *** 0.058 *** 0.060 *** 0.027 ***
( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 )
GAAPlj -0.046 *** -0.029 * -0.022 -0.020 -0.008
( 0.011 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
cross_listinglj 0.463 *** 0.457 *** 0.448 *** 0.383 ***
( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.039 )
turnover ratiol -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.045 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 )
turnover ratioj 0.006 ** 0.008 *** 0.001
( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
tradelj 0.218 ** 0.240 **
( 0.108 ) ( 0.099 )
lag_retj -0.001 -0.001
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )






contr corrj 0.335 ***
( 0.074 )
controls: time fixed effects
#obs 22231 22231 20598 12261 12261 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.30
Main findings
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Table 4. Robustness: specication, sample, crisis, and regulation
This table reports the robustness results of a Feasible GLS regression, as from Table 3, column (7).
Columns (1) to (3) consider alternative regression specications. In column (4), o¤shore destination countries
(Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Uruguay) are excluded from our
baseline sample, according to the IMF 2017 classication. In columns (5a) and (5b), the nancial crisis
period refers to years 2007 to 2009, while the sovereign debt crisis period refers to years 2010 to 2012.
Columns (6a) and (6b) investigate the interaction of EC with the SOX and MIFID regulation. Two-way
clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Crisis and regulation
nonlinear gravity
(1) (2) (3) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
EClj 0.318 *** 0.280 *** 0.311 *** 0.459 *** 0.338 *** 0.349 *** 0.407 *** 0.334 ***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.050 ) ( 0.042 )
distlj -0.129 *** -0.131 *** -0.419 *** -0.107 *** -0.135 *** -0.135 *** -0.128 *** -0.131 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
borderlj 0.428 *** 0.333 *** 0.373 *** 0.501 *** 0.425 *** 0.425 *** 0.428 *** 0.421 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.024 )
langlj 0.078 *** 0.039 ** 0.056 *** 0.075 *** 0.097 *** 0.097 *** 0.076 *** 0.080 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
EMUlj 0.544 *** 0.558 *** 0.509 *** 0.234 *** 0.559 *** 0.557 *** 0.538 *** 0.519 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.034 )
equal_lawlj 0.024 ** 0.073 *** 0.025 ** 0.037 *** 0.021 ** 0.022 ** 0.022 ** 0.023 **
( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
common_lawj 0.088 *** 0.208 *** 0.109 *** -0.071 *** 0.103 *** 0.104 *** 0.096 *** 0.117 ***
( 0.012 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 )
colonylj 0.119 *** 0.165 *** 0.117 *** 0.047 *** 0.118 *** 0.118 *** 0.121 *** 0.111 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )
GAAPlj -0.007 -0.005 -0.514 *** -0.015 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013
( 0.016 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
cross_listinglj 0.382 *** 0.418 *** 0.414 *** 0.528 *** 0.393 *** 0.396 *** 0.383 *** 0.368 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.040 )
rev_ADRj 0.028 *
( 0.014 )
stock exchange opennessl -0.004 *
( 0.002 )
stock exchange opennessj -0.008 *
( 0.004 )
(distlj )2 0.096 ***
( 0.009 )




(financial crisis)•(EClj ) -0.021
( 0.070 )
financial & sovereign debt crisis 0.015
( 0.017 )








(MIFIDj )•(EClj ) -0.064
( 0.061 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity,
trade linkages, lagged returns, country
governance, time fixed effects (as Table 3,
column (7))
#obs 12211 10245 12211 10747 12211 12211 12211 12211





additional controls no offshore
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis on EC specication
This table reports the results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 3, column
(7). In each column, the denition of EC lj varies. In column (1) the NYSE-Euronext platform also includes
the UK LIFFE derivative platform. In column (2), the OMX-Nasdaq group also includes the Norway stock
market. In columns (3a) to (3e), one stock exchange consolidation at a time is excluded. Two-way clustered
(investing country and time) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sensitivity analysis
EC specification
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e)
EClj 0.246 *** 0.484 *** 0.846 *** 0.090 *** 0.300 *** 0.322 *** 0.316 ***
( 0.028 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 )
distlj -0.126 *** -0.126 *** -0.128 *** -0.132 *** -0.129 *** -0.129 *** -0.129 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
borderlj 0.436 *** 0.412 *** 0.424 *** 0.438 *** 0.433 *** 0.428 *** 0.428 ***
( 0.024 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )
langlj 0.079 *** 0.081 *** 0.085 *** 0.076 *** 0.076 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
EMUlj 0.556 *** 0.522 *** 0.597 *** 0.571 *** 0.543 *** 0.541 *** 0.542 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 )
equal_lawlj 0.027 *** 0.015 0.028 *** 0.033 *** 0.024 ** 0.023 ** 0.023 **
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
common_lawj 0.094 *** 0.096 *** 0.095 *** 0.093 *** 0.096 *** 0.096 *** 0.096 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 )
colonylj 0.118 *** 0.118 *** 0.120 *** 0.125 *** 0.123 *** 0.120 *** 0.120 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )
GAAPlj -0.005 -0.011 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
( 0.016 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
cross_listinglj 0.384 *** 0.381 *** 0.371 *** 0.399 *** 0.383 *** 0.382 *** 0.383 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity,
trade linkages, lagged returns, country
governance, time fixed effects (as Table 3,
column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30
no MILANYSE-EURONEXT-LIFFE NASDAQ-OMX-Oslo no NYSE-EURONEXT no NASDAQ-OMX no CEESEG no LSE-BI
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Table 6. Interaction e¤ects: market size
This table reports the results of a feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 3, column
(7), with additional size regressors, and their interaction with stock exchange consolidation, as explicitly
reported in the table. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Size
stock exchange GDP
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
EClj 0.389 *** 0.375 *** 0.396 *** 0.378 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.038 )
listed sharesl -0.009
( 0.014 )
listed sharesl •EClj -0.027 ***
( 0.010 )
listed sharesj -0.018 ***
( 0.003 )








GDPj •EClj -0.020 ***
( 0.004 )
other controls: gravity variables, colonial
linkage, EMU, common law, GAAP, capital
mobility, liquidity, trade linkages, lagged
returns, country governance, time fixed effects
(as Table 3, column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Interaction effects
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Table 7. Interaction e¤ects: familiarity
This table reports the results of a feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 3, column
(7), with additional "familiarity" covariates, and their interaction with stock exchange consolidation, as
explicitly reported in the table. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Interaction effects
Familiarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EClj 0.513 *** 0.225 *** 0.248 *** 0.551 *** 0.287 *** 0.111 * 0.502 *** 0.158 *** 0.173 ***
( 0.044 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.116 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.057 )
distlj -0.130 ***
( 0.010 )
















colonylj •EClj 0.450 ***
( 0.087 )
equal lawlj 0.019 *
( 0.010 )












tradelj •EClj 1.859 ***
( 0.606 )
other controls: size, capital
mobility, liquidity, trade linkages,
lagged returns, country
governance, time fixed effects
(as Table 3, column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
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Table 8. Sensitivity analysis: econometric specication
This table the reports results following the specication of Table 3, column (7), but under di¤erent
econometric specications. Column (1) and (2) report the results under a Tobit and a Negative Binomial
specication, respectively. Columns (3a) to (3e), show the results of a Quantile regression, referred to
the percentiles reported at the top of the column. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) stan-




Tobit Negative Binomial Quantile regression
p25 p50 p75 p90
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
EClj 0.201 *** 0.214 *** 0.156 *** 0.255 *** 0.282 *** 0.234 **
( 0.074 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.107 )
distlj -0.284 *** -0.761 *** -0.059 *** -0.083 *** -0.151 *** -0.270 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.050 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.015 )
borderlj 0.437 *** 0.500 *** 0.213 *** 0.377 *** 0.818 *** 1.296 ***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.138 ) ( 0.122 )
langlj 0.117 *** 0.255 *** 0.039 *** 0.047 *** 0.058 ** 0.224 **
( 0.039 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.101 )
EMUlj 0.717 *** 0.911 *** 0.290 *** 0.377 *** 0.383 *** 0.912 ***
( 0.043 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.206 )
equal_lawlj 0.061 ** 0.107 ** 0.001 -0.001 0.030 ** 0.072 **
( 0.027 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.035 )
common_lawj 0.330 *** 0.628 *** -0.014 *** -0.007 0.040 *** 0.279 ***
( 0.028 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.042 )
colonylj 0.132 ** 0.160 ** 0.029 *** 0.046 *** 0.079 *** 0.058
( 0.055 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.054 )
GAAPlj -0.003 -0.289 *** -0.009 ** -0.037 *** -0.068 *** -0.110 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.035 )
cross_listinglj 0.693 *** 0.594 *** 0.062 *** 0.043 ** 0.086 2.095 ***
( 0.108 ) ( 0.113 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.658 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity,
trade linkages, lagged returns, country
governance, time fixed effects (as Table 3,
column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211
Pseudo-R2 0.53 0.42 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.22
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Table 9. Sensitivity analysis: outliers
This table reports the results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 3, column
(7), after treatment of the outliers.. Column (1) and (2) report the results of the winsorized sample, while
columns (3a) to (4b) report the results of the truncated distribution Two-way clustered (investing country




Winsorized distribution Truncated distribution
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EClj 0.327 *** 0.221 *** 0.334 *** 0.329 *** 0.132 *** 0.134 ***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
distlj -0.119 *** -0.098 *** -0.102 *** -0.100 *** -0.073 *** -0.068 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.004 )
borderlj 0.428 *** 0.283 *** 0.451 *** 0.450 *** 0.206 *** 0.203 ***
( 0.022 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
langlj 0.090 *** 0.057 *** 0.068 *** 0.067 *** 0.043 *** 0.045 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 )
EMUlj 0.541 *** 0.410 *** 0.444 *** 0.444 *** 0.339 *** 0.338 ***
( 0.032 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
equal_lawlj 0.018 * 0.018 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.001 -0.002
( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
common_lawj 0.084 *** 0.050 *** 0.055 *** 0.059 *** 0.008 * 0.011 **
( 0.012 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 )
colonylj 0.119 *** 0.088 *** 0.124 *** 0.125 *** 0.093 *** 0.091 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
GAAPlj -0.004 -0.028 *** -0.007 -0.008 -0.027 *** -0.029 ***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
cross_listinglj 0.347 *** 0.092 *** 0.162 *** 0.140 *** -0.021 -0.022
( 0.037 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity,
trade linkages, lagged returns, country
governance, time fixed effects (as Table 3,
column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12129 11662 11507 11040
Adj-R2 0.32 0.48 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.49
top 5% and 0top 1% and 0top 1% top 5% top 1% top 5%
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Table 10. Event-study approach
This table reports the results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 3, column
(7), with the inclusion of fe_EC lj, the xed-e¤ect EC component, and p_EC lj, the "pure" event e¤ect
(p_EC lj = fe_EC ljtime_event), where the time_event is equal to 1 after the merger and 0 before.
Column (1) considers the full sample, columns (2) and (3) consider the winsorized sample, while columns (4a)
to (5b) consider the truncated distribution. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Event-study approach
Full distribution Winsorized distribution Truncated distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
p_EClj 0.116 ** 0.131 ** 0.116 *** 0.188 *** 0.187 *** 0.095 *** 0.096 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 )
fe_EClj 0.215 *** 0.210 *** 0.110 *** 0.158 *** 0.154 *** 0.039 * 0.040 *
( 0.043 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 )
distlj -0.124 *** -0.114 *** -0.097 *** -0.099 *** -0.096 *** -0.072 *** -0.067 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.004 )
borderlj 0.419 *** 0.421 *** 0.279 *** 0.445 *** 0.445 *** 0.205 *** 0.202 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
langlj 0.084 *** 0.097 *** 0.061 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.044 *** 0.047 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 )
EMUlj 0.542 *** 0.542 *** 0.411 *** 0.445 *** 0.445 *** 0.338 *** 0.338 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
equal_lawlj 0.018 * 0.013 0.015 *** 0.023 *** 0.021 *** 0.000 -0.003
( 0.010 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
common_lawj 0.095 *** 0.084 *** 0.050 *** 0.055 *** 0.058 *** 0.008 * 0.011 **
( 0.013 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 )
colonylj 0.114 *** 0.112 *** 0.084 *** 0.119 *** 0.119 *** 0.092 *** 0.090 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
GAAPlj -0.010 -0.007 -0.029 *** -0.009 -0.010 *** -0.027 *** -0.029 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
cross_listinglj 0.360 *** 0.332 *** 0.088 *** 0.157 *** 0.136 *** -0.022 -0.023
( 0.039 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12129 11662 11507 11040
Adj-R2 0.30 0.32 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.49
top 5% top 5% and 0top 1% and 0top 1% top 5% top 1%
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Table 11. Endogeneity: full sample
This table reports in column (1) the results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of
Table 3, column (7). Column (3) reports the over-identied GMM estimation, relying on the two excluded
instruments reported in the table, J_High infolj and J_Low sizelj. Column (2c) reports the corresponding
rst stage regression, estimated through a Linear Probability Model (LPM). Columns (2a) and (2b) report
the rst stage on individual excluded instruments. At the bottom of the table, the instrumentsvalidity
tests (Relevance and Exogeneity tests) are reported. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
Endogeneity (full distribution) overidentified system
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj J_Low_sizelj Both J_instruments GMM
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3)
EClj 0.316 *** - - - 4.711 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.551 )
distlj -0.129 *** -0.012 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.150 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.015 )
borderlj 0.428 *** 0.077 *** 0.084 *** 0.077 *** 0.118
( 0.023 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.098 )
langlj 0.077 *** 0.005 0.010 ** 0.007 0.039
( 0.017 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.050 )
EMUlj 0.542 *** 0.038 *** 0.043 *** 0.037 *** 0.471 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.088 )
equal_lawlj 0.023 ** 0.048 *** 0.047 *** 0.049 *** -0.218 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.046 )
common_lawj 0.096 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** 0.421 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.049 )
colonylj 0.120 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.102
( 0.020 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.062 )
GAAPlj -0.008 0.045 *** 0.047 *** 0.046 *** -0.265 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.053 )
cross_listinglj 0.383 *** 0.030 ** 0.031 ** 0.028 ** 0.323 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.113 )
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj 0.039 *** 0.041 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.001 )
J_Low_sizelj 0.024 *** 0.025 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
Relevance: F-test     =  55.66
_______ _P(F-test) =   0.00
FGLS first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) second stage
Relevance:       F-test = 89.38  P(F-test)=  0.00
Exogeneity: J-test: χ2(1)=35.17   P(J-test)=  0.00
- HR-test: χ2(1)=32.24    P(HR-test)= 0.00
Relevance: F-test        = 116.41
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Table 12. Endogeneity: truncated distribution (top 5% and 0)
This table replicates the Table 11, but relatively to the truncated distribution (top 5% and 0). Column
(1) reports the results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 9, column (4b) of
the truncated distribution (top 5% and zeros). Column (3) reports the over-identied GMM estimation,
relying on the two excluded instruments reported in the table, J_High infolj and J_Low sizelj . Column
(2c) reports the corresponding rst stage regression, estimated through a Linear Probability Model (LPM).
Columns (2a) and (2b) report the rst stage on individual excluded instruments. At the bottom of the
table, the instrumentsvalidity tests (Relevance and Exogeneity tests) are reported. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Endogeneity (truncated: top 5% and 0) overidentified system
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj J_Low_sizelj Both J_instruments GMM
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3)
EClj 0.134 *** - - 0.324 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.118 )
distlj -0.068 *** -0.012 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.123 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.005 )
borderlj 0.203 *** 0.036 *** 0.042 *** 0.036 *** 0.195 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.017 )
langlj 0.045 *** -0.009 ** -0.005 -0.009 * 0.024 **
( 0.007 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.011 )
EMUlj 0.338 *** 0.038 *** 0.041 *** 0.037 *** 0.246 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.015 )
equal_lawlj -0.002 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.041 *** -0.005
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.008 )
common_lawj 0.011 ** -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 0.011 *
( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.006 )
colonylj 0.091 *** 0.016 *** 0.013 ** 0.015 ** 0.089 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.015 )
GAAPlj -0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 *** -0.064 ***
( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.009 )
cross_listinglj -0.022 0.031 ** 0.034 *** 0.031 ** 0.373 ***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.031 )
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj 0.031 *** 0.032 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.001 )
J_Low_sizelj 0.021 *** 0.022 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
Relevance:        F-test = 64.32  P(F-test)  = 0.00
Exogeneity:  J-test: χ2(1)=  1.50   P(J-test)  = 0.22
______   HR-test: χ2(1)=  0.57  P(HR-test)=0.45
Relevance: F-test:     76.92
________P(F-test):   0.00
Relevance: F-test:     47.51
________P(F-test):   0.00
Instruments' validity tests
FGLS first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) second stage
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Table 13. Endogeneity: a counterfactual test
This table follows the same structure as Table 12, with the exception of the instruments adopted. The
rst instrument captures the fact that any of the two exchanges in the country-pair features a high stock
market information (Or_High infolj), while the second instrument captures the fact that any of the two
exchanges in the country-pair has a low stock exchange size (Or_Low sizelj)
Endogeneity (truncated: top 5% and 0) overidentified system
excluded instruments
Or_High_infolj Or_Low_sizelj Both Or_instruments GMM
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3)
EClj 0.134 *** - - -0.144
( 0.017 ) ( 0.547 )
distlj -0.068 *** -0.014 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.128 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.009 )
borderlj 0.203 *** 0.040 *** 0.039 *** 0.037 *** 0.199 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.018 )
langlj 0.045 *** -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.013
( 0.007 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.016 )
EMUlj 0.338 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.285 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.042 )
equal_lawlj -0.002 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.041 *** 0.017
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.028 )
common_lawj 0.011 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** 0.008
( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.006 )
colonylj 0.091 *** 0.015 ** 0.013 ** 0.015 ** 0.105 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.017 )
GAAPlj -0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 *** -0.043 *
( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.022 )
cross_listinglj -0.022 0.031 ** 0.032 ** 0.029 ** 0.383 ***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.035 )
excluded instruments
Or_High_infolj -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.001 )
Or_Low_sizelj -0.009 ** -0.009 **
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
Relevance:        F-test= 13.78  P(F-test)  = 0.00
Exogeneity:  J-test: χ2(1)=11.85  P(J-test)  = 0.00
________HR-test: χ2(1)=5.72  P(HR-test)= 0.02
Relevance:     F-test= 23.42
________P(F-test)=   0.00
Relevance: F-test=    4.89
_______P(F-test)=   0.03
Instruments' validity tests
FGLS first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) second stage
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A Data appendix
A.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variable in the econometric analysis is wlj=MS_MSCIj:
Stock market portfolio weight (wlj)
The CPIS dataset contains information on foreign holdings only and does not include domestic
positions. In order to derive the foreign portfolio positions of country l in country j in the overall
portfolio, we need to retrieve the share of foreign assets. To accomplish this objective we need the
stock market capitalization of all country indexes, the outstanding foreign equity portfolio invest-




(MCAPl + FAl   FLl)
(2)
where FA stands for "foreign equity assets", FL for "foreign equity liabilities" andMCAP for
"stock market capitalization". After obtaining the foreign share FS it is possible to recover the
share of each foreign asset in the overall portfolio (wlj). Source: CPIS (IMF), IFS (IMF), World
Federation of Exchanges.
The 40 investing countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Czeck Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.
The 41 destination countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.
Note that some countries are included as investing but not as destination ones, and vice versa,
because of data availability. As reported by the IMF, in some cases within the CPIS, negative values
are reported for the value of residentsholdings of securities issued by a particular economy. Such
entries reect short positions in securities, usually resulting from the sale of securities acquired under
repurchase agreements. In our analysis, for consistency with the theoretical framework, we exclude
negative positions: they are less than 50 out of about 12 thousands of observations and their absolute
value is very low, as well.
We also exclude 39 outliers, whose magnitude was up to ve hundred times larger than the
median value and about 10 times larger than the highest 99.9 percentile value. These outliers refer
to extremely large position of countries within the CEESEG group - so that their inclusion would
make our results on the e¤ect of stock exchange consolidation even larger-, and to investment in
countries, such as Ireland, which in some instances may act as an o¤shore center. To address this
29Fidora et al. (2007) and Sorensen et al. (2007) follow the same procedure dealing with the CPIS dataset.
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latter issue, in Table 4, column (4), we report results run on a sub-sample of destination countries
which exclude potential o¤shore centers.
Market share (MSj)
Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (US$). Data are end of year values converted
to U.S. dollars using corresponding year-end foreign exchange rates.
Source: World Federation of Exchanges database.(from the World Bank database). Comple-
mented with data from CEIC Data, for countries not covered by the World Bank.
Float-adjusted market share (MS_MSCIj)
The world oat portfolio is a corrected value weighted portfolio obtained by multiplying the
market share by a fraction taking into account the fraction of closely held shares (Dahlquist et al.
(2003)). The adopted MSCI Investable Market Indexes (IMI) cover all investable large, mid and
small cap securities across the Developed, Emerging and Frontier Markets, targeting approximately
99% of each markets free-oat adjusted market capitalization.
Source: MSCI.30
A.2 Regressors
To ensure consistency with the theoretical framework, each variable X (dummy variables excluded)
enters our regression specications as the ratio of X to its world average. The subscript  indicates
that the corresponding variable can be referred to the country-pair lj, the destination country j
and/or to the investing country l.
Main regressor
Stock exchange consolidation (EC)
CEESEG: Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Czeck Republic since 2010.
NYSE-EURONEXT: Belgium, France and the Netherlands since 2001, Portugal since 2003, and
the USA since 2007 to June 2014. In the specication in column (1) of Table 5, it also comprises the
UK exchange since 2002 onwards (because of the fusion with the LIFFE platform).
NASDAQ-OMX: Sweden, Finland, Estonia since 2004, Denmark since 2005, and the USA since
2008. In the specication in column (2) of Table 5, it also comprises the Norway since 2007 onwards
(because of the acquisition of the 10% of the ownership of the Oslo Stock Exchange).
MILA: Colombia, Peru, and Chile since 2011. Mexico joined at the end of 2014, then considered
in the platform in 2015.
LSE-BI: the UK and Italy since 2007.
EClj: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing and the destination country share a common
exchange platform (0 otherwise).
ECl: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country l is part of a consolidated platform
(0 otherwise).
ECj: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the destination country j is part of a consolidated platform
(0 otherwise).
30Disclaimer by MSCI: The MSCI data contained herein is the property of MSCI Inc. (MSCI). MSCI, its a¢ liates
and its information providers make no warranties with respect to any such data. The MSCI data contained herein is
used under license and may not be further used, distributed or disseminated without the express written consent of
MSCI.
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Pair-specic regressors
Distance (distlj)
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source
(l) and destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as
weighted (by market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in
the regression is the ratio of the distance l   j to the average distance.
Common Border. (borderlj)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a
common border (0 otherwise).
Common Language. (langlj)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a
common language (0 otherwise)
Colonial linkage (colonylj)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a
colonial linkage (0 otherwise)
EMU (EMUlj)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are mem-
bers of the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency
dummy since included countries do not belong to any other currency union.
Common law (common_lawj)
Destination-specic dummy variable equal to 1 if the destination country has a "common law"
legal origin (0 otherwise).
Equal legal origin (equal_lawlj)
Bilateral-specic dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country and the destination
country share the same legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (0
otherwise). The countries included in our sample belong to four legal families: English, French,
German, Scandinavian.
Generalized Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPlj)
Total number of GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) di¤erences between investing
country l and destination country j. Measure based on the measure gaapdi¤2 in Bae et al. (2008).
Source: Bae et al. (2008).
Cross-listing (cross_listinglj)
This variable captures the number of country-to-country listings of the country pair lj (Sarkissian
and Schill (2009), Panel A of Table 2). We consider as regressor the number of bilateral cross-listing
of country j in country l relative to the total cross-listing in country l: This measure ideally ranges
from 0 (no bilateral cross-listing between l and j) to 1 (all cross-listing of country l are with country
j).
Trade closeness (tradelj)
The measure is constructed as the average of two ratios: the bilateral exports (lj) divided by the
total exports of the investing country l; and the bilateral imports (lj) divided by the total imports of
the investing country l (in millions of current US $). This measure ideally ranges from 0 (no bilateral
trade) to 1 (all trade ows of country l occur with country j)
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
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Country-specic regressors
Stock exchange openness (exchange_openness)
This variable is the ratio of foreign listed companies to domestic listed companies at the end of
year 2000. Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
International capital mobility (cap_mob)
Index (0-10) measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital ows assigning a lower rating
to countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions. In decreasing rating order are
ranked countries where: a) domestic investments by foreigners and foreign investments by local
residents are unrestricted; b) investments are restricted in a few industries within the countries; c)
investments are permitted but regulatory restrictions slow the mobility of capital; d) either domestic
investments by foreigners or foreign investments by local residents require approval from government
authorities; e) both domestic by foreigners and foreign investments by local require government
approval. Source: Economic Freedom Network.
Traded stocks to GDP (traded stocksj=GDPj)
Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the period. The regressor is
obtained by dividing the stocks traded by GDP. Source: Financial Sector Indicators (World Bank)
Number of listed shares (listed_shares)
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the countrys
stock exchanges at the end of the year. This indicator does not include investment companies, mutual
funds, or other collective investment vehicles. Source: Financial Sector Indicators (World Bank)
Lagged stock returns (lag_retj)
Stock market return (%, year-on-year): annual median value. We attribute to each country in
each year t; the average of the 3 lagged stock market returns. Source: Global Financial Development
(World Bank)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
GDP at purchasers prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Data are
in current U.S. dollars. Source: Economy and Growth Indicators (World Bank).
MiFID (MiFIDj)
Dummy variable equal to 1 for the destination country j belonging to the European Union since
2008 onwards (0 otherwise).
SOX (SOXj)
Dummy variable equal to 1 for the destination country j which adopted a signicant legisla-
tive improvement in corporate nancial reporting similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (0
otherwise).
In 2002 the United States Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). The Act is the
most important legislation a¤ecting corporate nancial reporting enacted in the United States since
the 1930s. It not only imposes additional disclosure requirements, but more importantly, proposes
substantive corporate governance mandates.
In 2002, the King Committee on Corporate Governance, issued the revision of the 1994 corporate
governance code for South Africa with requirements close to the US SOX.31
31Unlike other corporate governance codes such as Sarbanes-Oxley, the King Report code is non-legislative and is
based on principles and practices. Compliance with the King Reports is however a requirement for companies listed
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Because of this peculiarity, we checked for the sensitivity of our ndings to the
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In 2003, the government of Canadas province of Ontario passed the Budget Measures Act, known
as Bill 198, which closely duplicates the regulatory requirements contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.
In Australia, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act, a modication of the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 which governs corporate law, was enacted in July 2004.
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement to the Indian stock exchange came into e¤ect from 31 Decem-
ber 2005. It has been formulated for the improvement of corporate governance in all listed companies,
by promoting corporate fairness, transparency and accountability.
In June 2006, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, that is the main statute codifying
securities law and regulating securities companies in Japan, was promulgated. It is often referred to
as the Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In July 2008 the 8th EU directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament came into force in
member states. This Directive is generally considered as the European Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The Goshen Committee examined the appropriate structure and format for a corporate gover-
nance code in Israel, and recommended to partially adopt, with modications, Sections 302 and 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with full application of the regulations required beginning with
the annual nancial statements for the period ending on December 2010.
In the empirical analysis, the regulation dummies are therefore equal to 1 since the year of
adoption of the legislative measure onward (for the US and South Africa: 2002 onward; for Canada:
2003 onward; for Australia: 2004 onward; for Japan and India: 2006 onward; for the European
Union: 2008 onward; for Israel: 2011 onward).
Revised Antidirector Rights Index (rev_ADRj)
The index amends the original LLSV (1998) index (Djankov et al. (2008)). The revised index
relies on the same basic dimensions of corporate law, but denes them with more precision. Both
the original and the revised anti-director rights indices summarize the protection of minority share-
holders in the corporate decision-making process, including the right to vote. The index covers the
following six areas: (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote (i.e., the
requirement that shares be deposited before the shareholdersmeeting); (3) minority representation
on the board of directors through cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed
minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) preemptive rights to subscribe to
new securities issued by the company; and (6) the right to call a special shareholder meeting. The
general principle behind the construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate bet-
ter investor protection with laws that explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are
favorable to minority shareholders. Methodologically, the key di¤erence between the original and
revised indices of anti-director rights lies in the treatment of enabling provisions. See Djankov et al.
(2008) for further details.
Regulatory quality
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and imple-
ment sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Source:
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank). Details on the underlying data sources, the
aggregation method, and the interpretation of the indicators, can be found in the WGI methodology
paper (Kaufmann et al. (2010)).
The original indexes range from -2.5 to +2.5 with an average of 0. Since our variables all enter
exclusion of the South African act, and our results persist.
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in relative terms, we use the average as denominator and to avoid the zero in the denominator we
re-scale the range from 0 to 5 with an average of 2.5. Note that the descriptive statistics table
reports a mean that di¤ers from 2.5 because it reports averages across countries included in our
sample rather than global ones.
Control of corruption
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank). Details on the
underlying data sources, the aggregation method, and the interpretation of the indicators, can be
found in the WGI methodology paper (Kaufmann et al. (2010)).
The original indexes range from -2.5 to +2.5 with an average of 0. Since our variables all enter
in relative terms, we use the average as denominator and to avoid the zero in the denominator we
re-scale the range from 0 to 5 with an average of 2.5. Note that the descriptive statistics table
reports a mean that di¤ers from 2.5 because it reports averages across countries included in our
sample rather than global ones.
A.3 Instruments
Joint High stock market attention in l and j (J_High_infolj)
This variable, used as an instrument for the bilateral stock exchange consolidation index (EClj),
is aimed at capturing the depth of information in the involved countries. It is the average market
capitalization of the stocks listed in each country index, i.e., MCAP=listed_shares: A bilateral-
specic lj dummy is then constructed, considering the average market capitalization in the investing
(l) and destination (j) country. This dummy is equal to 1 if both the investing and the destination
country have a high average market capitalization of the stocks listed, i.e., if it is above the mean,
and 0 otherwise. Source: Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (MCAP ): World
Federation of Exchanges database.(from the World Bank database), complemented with data from
CEIC Data, for countries not covered by the World Bank; listed shares (listed_shares): Financial
Sector Indicators (World Bank).
The alternative instrument Or_high_infolj adopted in Table 13, is instead a dummy variable
equal to 1 if any of the stock exchanges in the country-pair has a high average size of the individual
listed stock, i.e., if it is above the mean, and 0 otherwise.
Joint Low exchange size of l and j (J_low_sizelj)
This variable, used as an instrument for the bilateral stock exchange consolidation index (EClj), is
aimed at capturing the size of the stock exchanges in the involved countries i.e.,MCAP: A bilateral-
specic lj dummy is then constructed, considering the size of the investing (l) and destination (j)
stock exchange. This dummy is equal to 1 if both the investing and the destination country have a low
size of the exchange, i.e., if it falls below the mean, and 0 otherwise. Source: Market capitalization
of listed domestic companies (MCAP ): World Federation of Exchanges database.(from the World
Bank database), complemented with data from CEIC Data, for countries not covered by the World
Bank.
The alternative instrument Or_low_sizelj adopted in Table 13, is instead a dummy variable
equal to 1 if any of the stock exchanges in the country-pair has a low size of the exchange, i.e., if it
falls below the mean, and 0 otherwise.
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B Additional tables
Table 14. Endogeneity: truncated distribution (top 5%)
This table replicates the Table 12, but considers a distribution truncated only from the high end (top
5%).
Endogeneity (truncated: top 5%) overidentified system
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj J_Low_sizelj Both J_instruments GMM
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3)
EClj 0.132 *** - - 0.275 **
( 0.017 ) ( 0.117 )
distlj -0.073 *** -0.010 *** -0.012 *** -0.010 *** -0.129 ***
( 0.005 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.005 )
borderlj 0.206 *** 0.066 *** 0.070 *** 0.066 *** 0.197 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.017 )
langlj 0.043 *** 0.010 ** 0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.020 *
( 0.007 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.011 )
EMUlj 0.339 *** 0.049 *** 0.055 *** 0.048 *** 0.252 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.015 )
equal_lawlj 0.001 0.041 *** 0.039 *** 0.041 *** -0.001
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.008 )
common_lawj 0.008 * -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 0.010
( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.006 )
colonylj 0.093 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.093 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.015 )
GAAPlj -0.027 *** 0.050 *** 0.053 *** 0.052 *** -0.058 ***
( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.009 )
cross_listinglj -0.021 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.371 ***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.030 )
excluded instruments
J_High_infolj 0.037 *** 0.037 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.001 )
J_Low_sizelj 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
Relevance: F-test:     101.58
________P(F-test):   0.00
Relevance: F-test:     43.06
________P(F-test):   0.00
Relevance:      F-test = 71.99   P(F-test)  = 0.00
Exogeneity:  J-test: χ2(1)=0.02   P(J-test)   = 0.89
_______HR-test: χ2(1)= 1.69   P(HR-test)= 0.19
FGLS first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) first stage (LPM) second stage
Instruments' validity tests
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Table 15. Endogeneity: summary of results
This table reports the relevant coe¢ cients (EClj in the FGLS and in the GMMs second stage) and of
the instruments (in the rst stage), across di¤erent treatments of outliers, following the winsorizing and
truncation structure of Table 9.
Endogeneity (summary over outliers' treatment)
overidentified system
Both J_instruments GMM
first stage (LPM) second stage
Outliers' treatment J_low_sizelj EClj
(endogenous regressor)
  (2a)
I. Full distribution 0.316 *** 0.041 *** 0.025 *** 4.711 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.551 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  89.38     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 35.17  P(J-test)   = 0.00
HR-test: χ2(1)=32.24 P(HR-test) = 0.00
II. Truncated distribution
a) top 5% and 0 0.134 *** 0.032 *** 0.022 *** 0.324 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.118 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  64.32     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 1.50  P(J-test)    =   0.22
HR-test: χ2(1)=0.57   P(HR-test) = 0.45
b) top 5% 0.132 *** 0.037 *** 0.022 *** 0.275 **
( 0.017 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.117 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  71.99     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 0.02   P(J-test)    = 0.89
HR-test: χ2(1)= 1.69  P(HR-test) = 0.19
c) top 1% and 0 0.329 *** 0.041 *** 0.025 *** 1.654 ***
( 0.028 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.273 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  83.44     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 80.68  P(J-test)   = 0.00
HR-test: χ2(1)=55.74  P(HR-test) =0.00
d) top 1% 0.334 *** 0.041 *** 0.024 *** 1.578 ***
( 0.028 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.269 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  85.60     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 70.18  P(J-test)   = 0.00
HR-test: χ2(1)=50.91  P(HR-test) =0.00
III. Winsorized distribution
a) top 5% 0.221 *** 0.025 *** 0.018 ** 0.806 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.129 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  89.38     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 61.42  P(J-test)   = 0.00
HR-test: χ2(1)=55.12  P(HR-test) =0.00
b) top 1% 0.327 *** 0.025 *** 0.018 ** 2.993 ***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.351 )
Exogeneity:
F-test=  89.38     P(F-test)=   0.00 J-test:    χ2(1)= 68.11  P(J-test)   = 0.00
HR-test: χ2(1)=30.43  P(HR-test) =0.00




















Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899436
Table 16. Event-study approach: Size interactions
This table reports results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 6, with
fe_EC lj, the xed-e¤ect EC component, and p_EC lj, the "pure" event e¤ect (p_EC lj = fe_EC ljtime_event),
where the time_event is equal to 1 after the merger and 0 before. Two-way clustered (investing country
and time) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
Event-study approach: interaction effects
Size
stock exchange GDP
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
p_EClj 0.177 *** 0.178 *** 0.186 *** 0.181 ***
( 0.057 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.058 )
fe_EClj 0.212 *** 0.212 *** 0.211 *** 0.211 ***
( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 )
listed sharesl -0.010
( 0.014 )
listed sharesl • p_EClj -0.023 **
( 0.011 )
listed sharesj -0.018 ***
( 0.003 )








GDPj  • p_EClj -0.020 ***
( 0.004 )
other controls: gravity variables, colonial linkage,
EMU, common law, GAAP, capital mobility, liquidity,
trade linkages, lagged returns, country governance,
time fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
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Table 17. Event-study approach: Familiarity interactions
This table reports results of a Feasible GLS regression, following the specication of Table 7, with
fe_EC lj, the xed-e¤ect EC component, and p_EC lj, the "pure" event e¤ect (p_EC lj = fe_EC ljtime_event),
where the time_event is equal to 1 after the merger and 0 before. Two-way clustered (investing country
and time) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
Event-study approach: interaction effects
Familiarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
p_EClj 0.307 *** 0.033 0.055 0.346 *** 0.072 -0.083 0.324 *** -0.047 -0.010
( 0.061 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.125 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.071 )
fe_EClj 0.204 *** 0.210 *** 0.211 *** 0.235 *** 0.225 *** 0.212 *** 0.220 *** 0.219 *** 0.212 ***
( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 )
distlj -0.125 ***
( 0.010 )
































tradelj • p_EClj 1.675 ***
( 0.614 )
other controls: size, capital mobility, liquidity, trade
linkages, lagged returns, country governance, time
fixed effects (as Table 3, column (7))
#obs 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211 12211
Adj-R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
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